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A Cost Analysis Approach to Determining
the Reasonableness of Using Domestic Violence
as an Insurance Classification
I. Introduction
Domestic violence is the leading cause of injury to American women.' Every
year approximately four million women are attacked by a domestic partner.2 These
victims face many obstacles that prevent them from successfully escaping their
batterers.3 These obstacles include: economic concerns,.lack of affordable housing and
temporary shelters, fear of retaliation, harassment, instability, and lack of financial sup-
port.4 Due to these obstacles and according to the research that indicates that children
who live in these abusive environments are more likely to become future batterers or
victims of domestic violence, a continuous cycle of abuse is likely to persist.' Despite
these obstacles, however, fifty to ninety percent of victims of domestic violence report
that they have attempted, although often unsuccessfully, to escape.6
1. See Don't Let Insurers Cancel - Some Companies Compound Abuse, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
May 31, 1997, at 10A (suggesting that approximately 1,400 women die each year because of domestic
violence); see also DIANE CRAVEN, PH.D., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICIMS OF VIOLENT
CRIMES (1996) (stating that in 1994 women were about two-thirds more likely to be victims of vio-
lence than men).
2. See 143 CONG. REc. E509-02 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1997) [hereinafter Sanders] (statement of
Rep. Sanders) (noting that it is difficult to obtain an annual estimate of the exact number of domestic
violence victims because the abuse is significantly underreported); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: VIOLENCE BETwEEN INTIMATES (1994) (reporting in one study that about one in five fe-
males who were victimized by their spouse or ex-spouse stated that they had been a victim of a series
of three of more assaults in the last six months that were so similar that they could not distinguish
between one of the assaults and another); CRAVEN, supra note 1 (stating that female homicide victims
are more than twice as likely to be killed by intimate partners than are male victims); Anne Stein,
Will Health Care Reform Protect Victims of Abuse? Treating Domestic Violence as a Public Health
Issue, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 16, 17 (1994) (suggesting that 42% of all homicide victims are victims of
domestic violence); Margo L. Ely, Abuse Victims Face New Battle: Insurance, CHICAGO DAILY L.
BULL., May 12, 1997, at 6 (recognizing that domestic violence is a public health issue).
3. See Ellen J. Morrison, Note, Insurance Discrimination Against Battered Women: Proposed
Legislative Protections, 72 IND. L.J. 259, 261-62 (1996) (identifying the obstacles that discourage vic-
tims from attempting escape).
4. See id. at 261-63.
5. See Insurance for Victims of Domestic Violence: Testimony of the Discriminatory Practices
Working Group of the Nat'l Assoc. of Ins. Commissioners Before the Comm. on Labor & Human Re-
sources of the U.S. Senate, 1995 WL 449181 (1995) [hereinafter Senn] (statement of the Honorable
Deborah Senn, Insurance Commissioner of Washington) (noting that discriminatory insurance practices
undermine the social policy goal of eliminating the social costs of domestic violence); Domestic Vio-
lence: Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Gov't Operations, 1994 WL
541271 (1994) [hereinafter Campbell] (Statement of Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Ph.D., RN, FAAN Chair)
(describing the potential mental health consequences of children who live in abusive environments).
6. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 262; see also VIOLENCE BETWEEN INTIMATES, supra note 2, at
4 (noting that data shows that 80% of female victims also took some form of self-protective action
during the attack); L.H. Otis, Domestic Abuse Law Hearings Sought (Congressional Hearings Into Al-
leged Insurance Co. Discrimination Against Domestic-Violence Victims), NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. &
CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFIT MGMT., Sept. 29, 1997, at 3 (describing the experience of one woman
who was denied homeowner's insurance even after she left her abusive husband); Sera L. Tank, Do-
mestic Violence Victims Experience Difficulty Securing Insurance Coverage (last modified Sept. 18,
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The costs associated with domestic violence are shocking. Abuse-related medical
treatment in the United States is estimated to be thirty-one billion dollars.' Domestic
violence is estimated to cost employers approximately three to five billion dollars
annually.8 Law enforcement costs are also substantial because domestic violence is
responsible for generating the largest number of calls made to police every year. 9 The
total annual cost of domestic violence in the United States is estimated to be sixty-
seven billion dollars. 0
During the past thirty years, as individuals began to realize the prevalence of and
the costs associated with domestic violence in the United States, victims' advocates
started a movement to educate society about this widespread danger." As a result,
legislators, medical professionals, and law enforcement officials joined victims' advo-
cates in encouraging victims to report and document abuse incidents, to obtain restrain-
ing orders, and to leave their abusive environments.'" In addition, the medical com-
munity and legislatures began to encourage medical professionals to report suspicious
injuries in medical records to establish a record of abuse that may be used later as
evidence in criminal and civil proceedings."
1995) <http://www.spub.ksu.edu/issuesvlO0/fa/nO20/city-gov-domestic-violence.html> (noting that women
who leave their abusers may be viewed by insurance companies as a higher risk).
7. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 264 (stating that this annual medical cost is the equivalent of
$124 per year for every person living in the United States). But see Campbell, supra note 5 (stating
that the annual national health care costs are estimated to total $857.3 million). Additional health-relat-
ed costs that may not be included in traditional estimates due to problems of identification and
underreporting, include the costs of long-term mental health services and birth defects. See id. (stating
that victims of domestic violence are more likely to suffer serious mental health problems, seek late
prenatal care, and that abuse during pregnancy significantly increases the risk of lower birth weight,
low material weight gain, infections, anemia, and alcohol and other drug abuse); 143 CoNG. REc.
S1659-03, S1678 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Wellstonel (statement of Sen. Wellstone) (stat-
ing that the total annual medical cost is approximately forty-four million dollars resulting from 21,000
hospitalizations and 28,700 emergency room visits); 141 CoNG. REc. S1790-01 (1995) (article written
by Sen. Wellstone) (noting that other health consequences of domestic violence include birth defects
and miscarriages).
8. See Wellstone, supra note 7 (explaining that the costs to an employer results from decreased
productivity, increased absenteeism, and increased health costs); see also Morrison, supra note 3, at
264-65 (estimating the cost to employers to be thirteen billion dollars a year).
9. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 264 (stating that New York City spent forty-one million dol-
lars in 1989 on domestic violence arrests).
10. See Wellstone, supra note 7; see also 141 CONG. REc. H10720-01, H10723 (daily ed. Oct.
24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee) (noting that children who witness abuse at home are likely
to become abusers or victims when they become adults); Morrison, supra note 3, at 265 (describing
additional costs for the provision of emergency shelters, unreported injuries, and incidents of abuse).
11. See Insurance for Victims of Domestic Violence, Testimony in Support of Senate Bill 524, Be-
fore the Labor & Human Resources Comm. of the U.S. Senate, 1995 WL 449183 (1995) [hereinafter
Durborow] (statement of Nancy Durborow, Health Projects Coordinator of the Pennsylvania Coalition
Against Domestic Violence) (discussing the efforts of the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic
Violence which was founded in 1976); Morrison, supra note 3, at 259 (noting that advocacy efforts
have resulted in some legal reforms).
12. See Senn, supra note 5. Legislators and state representatives have taken several steps to en-
courage prevention and to provide further protection for victims of domestic violence. See Violence
Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1997); S.367, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing the Battered
Women's Employment Protection Act designed to ensure eligibility for unemployment benefits to vic-
tims of domestic violence who are forced to leave their jobs due to domestic violence); Timothy J.
Connolly, Cellucci Targets Domestic Abuse, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Aug. 2, 1997, at Al (discussing
an executive order issued by Massachusetts Governor Paul Cellucci, that gives automatic eligibility for
unemployment benefits to victims who are forced to leave their jobs due to domestic violence).
13. See Domestic Violence: Oral Testimony of the American College of Emergency Physicians, Be-
fore the House Gov't Operations Comm., Subcomm. On Human Resources & Intergovernmental Rela-
1999] Domestic Violence and Insurance Classification
Ironically, while domestic violence advocates developed strategies designed to
elicit support from legislators, law enforcement officials, and medical and other profes-
sionals in assisting victims of domestic violence, the insurance industry also took no-
tice of the problem and began to alter its practice of insuring victims of domestic
violence) 4 The insurance industry began using domestic violence as an insurance
classification that is used to decide whether to offer insurance to an applicant, what
rates to charge, and whether to cancel coverage for existing customers.15
Domestic violence is currently used as an insurance classification in all lines of
insurance 6  including health," life,'8  disability, 9  property, 0  homeowners,2
tions, 1994 WL 541275 (F.D.C.H.) (1994) (statement of Patricia R. Salber, MD, FACEP) (describing
the unique role emergency room personnel can play in identifying, interrupting, and preventing the cy-
cle of domestic abuse); Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Violence: Do
They Promote Patient Well-Being?, 273 JAMA 1781, 1781-82 (1995); Caroline W. Jacobus, Legislative
Responses to Discrimination in Women's Health Care: A Report Prepared for the Commission to Study
Sex Discrimination in the Statutes, 16 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 153, 214 (1995) (describing the Division
on Women's protocol which requires medical staff to document any evidence of domestic violence or
statements made by possible victims); Morrison, supra note 3, at 259-60 (explaining that this reporting
requirement was designed to develop evidence that could be used to obtain restraining orders or other
legal restraints); Family Violence Prevention Fund, 4 Health Alert: Routine Screening for Domestic
Violence I (Spring 1996); Health Resource Center on Domestic Violence, Mandatory Reporting of
Domestic Violence by Health Care Providers: An Information Packet on the California Mandatory Re-
porting Law (unpublished information packet, on file with the Journal of Legislation); Health Resource
Center on Domestic Violence, General Information on the Health Care Response to Domestic Violence:
An Information Packet for Health Care Providers (unpublished information packet, on file with the
Journal of Legislation); Health Resource Center on Domestic Violence, Screening Patients for Domestic
Violence: An Information Packet for Health Care Providers (unpublished information packet, on file
with the Journal of Legislation).
14. See Sanders, supra note 2 (stating that insurers have used domestic violence as a criterion in
deciding whether to, and at what price to, provide health, life, disability, homeowners, and auto in-
surance coverage); Katharine Q. Seelye, Battered Women Put Insurers on Spot, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
1994, at A7 (describing the case of one woman who was denied life, health, mortgage, and disability
insurance after the insurance company learned that the woman had a history of domestic disputes from
her medical reports).
15. See Bill Sloat, Insurers Hit Abuse Victims Again When Claims are Denied, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 12, 1997, at Al (noting that domestic violence classifications not only involve
spousal abuse but also include parental abuse as exemplified by Blue Cross's rejection of health care
coverage for three children who were subjects of parental abuse).
16. See 141 CONG. REC. E2199-02 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1995) [hereinafter Sanders Ill (statement of
Rep. Sanders) (noting that health, life, disability, homeowners, and automobile insurers utilize domestic
violence in deciding who to insure and how much to charge for insurance); Nancy Durborow & Terry
Fromson, Insurance Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence 2 (July 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Journal of Legislation) (describing specific cases of women and children
who were denied payment or coverage for either health, life, disability, or property and casualty insur-
ance).
17. See Elliot Zaret, Bill Would Ban Insurance Company Bias: Abuse Victims Denied Coverage,
DENVER POST, May 23, 1998, at A25 (discussing the case of one woman, whose husband broke her
nose, that was denied health insurance because she had "chosen to live a dangerous lifestyle'); Fern
Shen, For the Battered Spouse, Insurers' Bias Worsens Pain, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at AI (de-
scribing the case of one woman who was denied life and health insurance after State Farm obtained
information from a doctor's report which indicated that the woman came from an "unstable family
environment").
18. See Monica C. Fountain, Insurance Companies Hit Battered Women Too, CHI. TRIB., June 4,
1995, at 1. For example, one woman was denied life insurance coverage when the insurance company
examined her medical records that indicated the applicant had been treated for injuries resulting from
domestic violence. See id.
19. See Sanders II, supra note 16 (noting that insurers consider a history of domestic violence in
providing disability, health, life, homeowners, and automobile insurance); Editorial, Cover Domestic
Victims, DENVER PosT, May 28, 1998, at BIO (noting that one woman from Iowa, who was sexually
assaulted as a child, was denied disability insurance even though she had an adult record of good
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automobile,22 and casualty insurance.23 In 1994, a House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Crime and Criminal Justice informal survey indicated that eight out of the sixteen
largest insurance companies in the United States used domestic violence as a factor in
deciding who to insure, what coverage to offer, and what rates to charge.24 The Insur-
ance Commissioner of Pennsylvania reported the results of a 1994 formal survey that
indicated that twenty-four percent of the insurance companies that responded reported
considering domestic violence in making insurance decisions and the results of a simi-
lar study, reported by the Insurance Commissioner of Kansas in December 1995,
showed that twenty-four percent of the responding companies used domestic violence
as a criterion in insurance decisions.'
Insurance companies use several methods to identify possible victims of domestic
violence.' First, insurers require applicants to sign a release form permitting inspec-
tion of their medical records." These medical records often reveal information about
health).
20. See Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at 5. For example, one woman's property claim
was denied because her former, abusive boyfriend broke into her home and stole her personal property.
See id.
21. See Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 21, 1998) (highlighting the case of a woman
from Seattle who was denied coverage after her husband blew up her home); Durborow and Fromson,
supra note 16, (describing the case of a woman who was denied payment under her homeowner's pol-
icy for a bodily injury claim resulting from injuries sustained when her husband set her on fire, be-
cause of Prudential's policy provisions which exclude coverage for intentional and criminal acts).
22. See Editorial: Cover Domestic Victims, supra note 19, at BIO (noting that one woman from
Georgia was denied automobile and homeowner insurance because her estranged husband might run her
off the road or set her house on fire); Durborow and Fromson, supra note 16, at 5 (describing the
case of a community advocacy group that was denied automobile insurance because the group planned
to use the vehicle to transport victims of domestic violence who may be chased by their abusers).
23. See Sanders II, supra note 16. For example, Allstate denied one woman's claim for payment
under her fire insurance policy because her history of spousal abuse was discovered by the insurance
company in court and by police records and because the fire investigator suspected arson. See Sloat,
supra note 15, at Al (describing Allstate's response to the federal lawsuit the insureds filed).
24. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 266-67 (acknowledging that since the survey, two of those
companies, Nationwide and State Farm, report that they no longer use domestic violence as a classifi-
cation criterion). Victims' advocates and legislators, however, question the motivation of State Farm's
allegedly altruistic acts. See L.H. Otis, State Farm Challenged on P-C Domestic Abuse Efforts, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., May 19, 1997, at 1. It is difficult, how-
ever, to determine how widespread the use of domestic violence as a classification is because in-
surance companies are not required to disclose their reasons for their insurance decisions, regulatory
agencies do not require insurance companies to report the criteria used in making insurance decisions,
and victims are reluctant to report alleged insurance discrimination for fear of retaliation and economic
concerns. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 267; Judi Hasson, Firms That Don't Insure Battered Women
Examined, USA TODAY, June 2, 1994, at A6 (quoting Rep. Charles Schumer, chairman of a subcom-
mittee studying domestic violence issues, who estimated that insurance companies deny coverage to
thousands of women).
25. See Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at 2 (noting that of those insurance companies that
responded to the 1994 formal survey, 74% of life insurers, 65% of health insurers, and 47% of acci-
dent insurers used domestic violence as a criterion in deciding whether to accept new applications, and
stating that of those insurance companies that responded to the similar Kansas study, 65% of the life
insurers, 56% of the health insurers, and 45% of the accident insurers reported using domestic violence
as a criterion in deciding whether to accept new applications).
26. See id. at 1; see also Life Ins. Assoc. of Mass. v. Commissioner of Ins., 530 N.E.2d 168,
171 (Mass. 1988) (acknowledging that insurance companies are permitted to solicit information from
applicants to make insurance coverage decisions).
27. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 267 (noting that the accuracy and reliability of these medical
records are increasing due to the recent training provided to medical personnel and the detailed proto-
cols regarding documentation issued); Kathy Showalter, Insurers Can Get Info on Victims of Abuse,
New Law Protects Victims From Loss of Benefits, 14 CINCtNNATI Bus. COURIER, Sept. 26, 1997, at
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past incidents of abuse that medical professionals documented for later evidentiary
use. 8 Second, insurance companies may obtain information on risk factors from com-
puter databases such as the Medical Information Bureau (MIB) and Equifax.29 Finally,
insurance companies also examine court documents and credit reports that often con-
tain information about protection orders.3 As a result, victims of domestic violence
are discouraged from disclosing their history of abuse and from seeking necessary
medical treatment and protection, because the primary source of information utilized
by insurance companies to support their decisions to deny or cancel insurance or
charge higher rates are medical and court records.'
This article considers the reasonableness of using domestic violence as an insur-
ance classification. This article will also analyze current and proposed legislative ef-
forts to restrict the use of domestic violence as a classification used in making insur-
ance decisions. Part II of this article provides an overview of the insurance industry. It
describes the original goals of private insurance and the methods insurance companies
use, including classifications, to achieve their ultimate goal, to make a profit. It also
describes the two dominant perspectives on the use of insurance classifications. Part III
discusses legal constraints on the insurance industry's use of classifications. Part IV
asserts that the use of domestic violence as an insurance classification violates the
traditional requirement that there be a statistical correlation between the classification
and the risk of loss, because insurers have failed to present any statistical support for
their use of domestic violence as a classification. Part V compares other prohibited
classifications to the use of domestic violence as a classification and concludes that
reasonableness is the test that should govern the use of insurance classifications. Part
VI examines the reasonableness of the use of domestic violence as an insurance classi-
fication by weighing the costs to the insurance industry of not using the classification
versus the cost to society of using the classification. Part VII concludes that the eco-
nomic, psychological, and social costs to society of using domestic violence as an
insurance classification justifies prohibiting the use of domestic violence as a classifi-
cation, despite the economic costs to the insurance industry.
II. Overview of the Insurance Industry
The insurance industry first introduced the concept of insurance as a method of
distributing the risk of loss.32 An insurer assumes an individual's risk of loss in ex-
44.
28. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 267 (discussing the sources insurers rely on in determining
whether an applicant is at risk due to domestic violence); Showalter, supra note 44 (noting that advo-
cates did not foresee this use of medical records when they fought for laws requiring medical profes-
sionals to document information concerning a patient's injuries from domestic violence).
29. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 268 (noting that the MIB is funded by the insurance industry
and that it is used by more than 600 insurance companies to share information about applicants);
Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at I (noting that insurance companies that subscribe to these da-
tabases must also report client risk factors so that the database may be updated).
30. See Showalter, supra note 27, at 44 (noting that insurers often maintain their own databases
identifying an individual's risk factors); Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at 1 (stating that these
sources "are becoming popular underwriting tools'.
31. See Senn, supra note 5 (stating that victims of domestic violence are discouraged because
they fear they will not be able to obtain, or will lose, insurance coverage).
32. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 412 (1914) (stating that the fundamen-
tal goal of insurance is to distribute widely the risk of loss so that many individuals will bear the
risk, thereby decreasing the risk of great catastrophes); Insurance Fed'n of Pa., Inc. v. Foster, 587
A.2d 865, 870 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (quoting the testimony of Robbert Dobbins, Vice President of
1999]
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change for the payment of a premium equal to the individual's expected loss.33 The
insurer's goal is to make a profit, which, insurers argue, will be accomplished through
accurate calculations of an individual's risk of loss, wise investments of money re-
ceived from premiums, and through accurate grouping of insureds posing similar
risks.34 Insurance companies use an individual's risk of loss to determine whether to
offer or deny the individual coverage and to determine the terms and cost of the insur-
ance.
35
Traditionally, insurance companies have used a statistical analysis to calculate the
Guardian Life Insurance Company of America, in which he stated that the risk of loss is decreased by
pooling the claims of many individuals); Jill Gaulding, Note, Race, Sex and Genetic Discrimination in
Insurance: What's Fair?, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1646, 1651 (1995) (analyzing the economic constraints
of insurance classification choices).
33. See Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1651 (describing the calculation of a premium). An
individual's expected loss is calculated by the probability of the loss multiplied by the size of the pos-
sible loss. See id. In addition, the insurer charges a small fee to cover its overhead costs. See id.
Thus, the individual benefits by exchanging an unlimited risk of loss for the certainty of paying only
a limited loss. See id.
34. See Massachusettes Auto. Rating & Accident Prevention Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins., 424
N.E.2d 1127, 1135 (Mass. 1981) (recognizing that insurers earn most of their profits through Investing
and not through underwriting); Katt v. Commissioner of Ins., 505 N.W.2d 37, 40 (Mich. CL App.
1993) (reasoning that profit is necessary to ensure the availability of adequate resources to cover as-
sumed risks and to satisfy claims); In re N.J.A.C. 11:1-20, 505 A.2d 177, 180 (NJ. Super. CL App.
Div. 1986) (suggesting that the financial status of the entire insurance industry is favorable due to
wise investments and allowable tax burdens); Leah Wortham, The Economics of Insurance Classifica-
tion: The Sound of One Invisible Hand Clapping, 47 OHIo ST. L. J. 835, 861 (1986) (critiquing the
insurance industry's argument that economic reasoning justifies the use of insurance classifications);
Morrison, supra note 3, at 286-87 (analyzing the incompatibility of the private goal of insurance com-
panies to make a profit and the public goal of ensuring the affordability and availability of insurance).
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts also recognized the authority of the commissioner of
insurance to make equitable adjustments in rate making to achieve the legislative policy of ensuring
the availability and affordability of automobile insurance to all eligible individuals. See Massachusettes
Auto. Rating, 424 N.E.2d at 1134. The following sources provide examples of the interpretation of
regulations concerning underwriting and insurance profits. See id. at 1131-35; Insurance Dep't. v. Phila-
delphia, 173 A.2d 811, 824-827 (Pa. Super. CL 1961) (recognizing the need to consider an insurer's
ability to earn a fair and reasonable profit in approvals of rate making).
35. See Wilson v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 427 (CL App.
1996) (describing the fundamental importance of these decisions to the insurance industry in order to
spread risk of loss in an "economically feasible way" and the court's evaluation of the reasonableness
of these practices); Telles v. Commissioner of Ins., 574 N.E.2d 359, 360 (Mass. 1991) (considering the
use of sex-based mortality differences in life insurance coverage decisions). Insurance companies refer
to the decision regarding whether to offer insurance to an individual as underwriting. See id. In addi-
tion, the decision on the terms of the insurance is called coverage and the cost of the premium is
called rating. See Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1652; see also Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification:
Too Important to be Left to the Actuaries, 19 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 349, 354 (1986) (suggesting
other definitions of underwriting that are used by insurance companies). For the purposes of this arti-
cle, I will refer to all insurance coverage, rating, and underwriting decisions as underwriting.
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risk of loss.' The statistical analysis results in classifications that insurance compa-
nies use to assign individuals to different groups based on risk of loss.37 Theoretical-
ly, coverage decisions and insurance rates are then based on this classification.'
There are two dominant perspectives on the use of classifications in the insur-
ance industry: the fair discrimination and the antidiscrimination perspectives.39 Insur-
ance companies are the predominant advocates of the fair discrimination perspective.
According to this perspective insurance companies argue, and courts have historically
agreed, that the use of classifications that are based on a statistically significant rela-
tionship to risk of loss ensures fairness.' For example, individuals who are at higher
risk for injury, and therefore are more likely to utilize their insurance coverage, will
pay more than individuals who are at lower risk.'2 Thus, theoretically everyone pays
for what they receive and there is no subsidization by individuals of different risk
groups. 3 Examples of classifications that insurers who rely on the fair discrimination
36. See Brest v. Commissioner of Ins., 169 N.E. 657, 660-61 (Mass. 1930) (stating that risk of
loss must be based on statistics, experience, and data, and that classifications based on statistical risk
of loss should be upheld despite theory or logic). But see Capital Blue Cross v. Commonwealth Ins.
Dept., 383 A.2d 1306, 1309 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (noting that underwriting decisions are not based
on "an exact science"); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DIsTRBUTNG RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1986) (stating that insurers will only attempt to refine risk classifications until the
cost of obtaining data exceeds the benefit realized by the refinement); Wortham, supra note 35, at 354
(describing informal methods insurance companies may also use in making insurance decisions, such as
lists of unacceptable risks that are informally passed amongst underwriters); Gaulding, supra note 32,
at '1652 (suggesting that insurance decisions are more likely to be made on the basis of subjective be-
liefs); Morrison, supra note 3, at 269 (noting, however, numerous reasons why in actuality, insurance
decisions are rarely based on sound statistical methodology).
37. See Century Cab, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 100 N.E.2d 481, 488-89 (Mass. 1951) (de-
scribing the process of using statistically significant risk of loss based on reliable evidence of experi-
ence to develop a formula utilized to form classes of individuals who pose similar risks); Regina Aus-
tin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (1983).
38. See Century Cab, 100 N.E.2d at 488 (describing the formula used to fix rates); Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542, 552 (Pa. 1984) (stating that insurance rates
must be actuarially sound, which requires a reasonable relationship between the risk of loss and the
rate to be paid by a certain class). But see Wortham, supra note 35, at 354 (describing informal meth-
ods insurance companies may use in making insurance decisions).
39. See Wortham, supra note 35, at 350; see also ABRAHAM, supra note 36, at 5 (utilizing the
terms libertarianism and egalitarianism to characterize the two approaches to the permissibility of insur-
ance classifications, instead of the fair discrimination or antidiscrimination perspectives). But see
Wortham, supra note 35, at 350 (adding two overlooked perspectives including an appreciation that
insurance is a necessity and that selective competition in the insurance industry possesses limited utility
under the free market and public policy viewpoints); Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1647-50 (suggesting
that current unfair discrimination laws do not entirely reflect either of these two perspectives because
they prohibit the use of race and genetic discrimination while allowing sex discrimination; therefore,
Gaulding proposes an alternative view that widely shared beliefs about fairness should govern the use
of classifications); .
40. See Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1647.
41. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1100 n.6 (1983) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that most states prohibiting unfair discrimination merely prohibit discrimination within the
same class and allow classifications that are statistically sound); Telles v. Commissioner of Ins., 574
N.E.2d 359, 360-61 (Mass. 1991) (acknowledging that fair discrimination allows insurers to group indi-
viduals posing the same risk together for determination of premiums to ensure that individuals posing
a lower risk do not subsidize those who present a higher risk of loss; therefore, unfair discrimination
only occurs when individuals who pose the same risk are treated differently); Health Ins. Ass'n of
Am. v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 618-19 (App. Div. 1990) (stating that a goal of insurance regula-
tion is to ensure that underwriting practices are fair to policyholders by not requiring cross-subsidiza-
tion of differing risk categories); Deborah S. Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually
Fair? A Case Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355, 358-59 (1997).
42. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 269.
43. See Life Ins. Ass'n of Mass. v. Commissioner of Ins., 530 N.E.2d 168, 171 (Mass. 1988)
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 25:195
perspective have used include race, ' sex,' domestic violence, ' age, ' human im-
munodeficiency virus (HIV) test results,' and physical or mental impairments.'
The second dominant view is the antidiscrimination perspective." Proponents of
this perspective argue that individuals have a right not to be classified for insurance
purposes on the basis of unacceptable classifications, especially those classifications
restricted by civil rights laws that govern other industries or activities.5 ' Proponents of
the antidiscrimination perspective consider unacceptable classifications to include those
that are not causally related to the risk of loss, are not controllable, are associated with
historical or invidious discrimination, or are socially unacceptable. 2 Therefore, advo-
(acknowledging that the basic principle underlying unfair discrimination statutes is that insurance com-
panies must treat individuals of the same risk class the same); Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., 551 N.Y.S.2d
at 618-19 (stating that insurance regulations also attempt to ensure that policyholders are not required
to subsidize the solvency of the insurer); see also Insurance Dept. v. Philadelphia, 173 A.2d 811, 820
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) (discussing the tendency of insurance companies, when left unregulated, to under-
charge insureds in order to compete, thus resulting in an inability to pay losses).
44. See, e.g., Equitable Assurance Soc'y of U.S. v. State Comm'n on Human Relations, 430 A.2d
60 (Md. 1981) (considering the use of race in underwriting practices for life insurance providers);
Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542, 543 (Wis. 1953) (describing the use of race and other classifica-
tions including "the applicant's physical condition, occupation, age, habits, morals, medical history, and
the medical history of parents" as classifications used in underwriting decisions for the provision of
life insurance).
45. See, e.g., In re Binghampton GHS Employees Fed. Credit Union v. State Div. of Human
Rights, 564 N.E.2d 1051 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that the exclusion of coverage for normal pregnancies
in a health and disability insurance policy is sex discrimination). Accord. Colorado Civil Rights
Comm'n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1988); Bully v. General Motors Corp., 328
N.W.2d 24, 28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Peterson, 866 P.2d 241, 244
(Mont. 1993). See also Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542 (Pa.
1984) (holding that the use of sex in automobile insurance underwriting practices, though actuarially
sound, violates the state's Equal Rights Amendment and is against public policy).
46. See Jacobus, supra note 13, at 165 (describing the case of a battered woman who was denied
health, life, and mortgage insurance because her previous history of abuse was considered in catego-
rizing her as a high risk); Stein, supra note 2 (describing the justifications insurance companies give
for refusing to insure victims of domestic violence); Ely, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that insurance
companies are using medical and police records of domestic abuse to deny insurance coverage).
47. See Insurance Servs. Office v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 So. 2d 515 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (re-
viewing the use of age as a reasonable classification in automobile insurance underwriting practices).
48. See Life Ins. Ass'n. of Mass. v. Commissioner of Ins., 530 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. 1988) (consid-
ering the argument of insurance companies, who had utilized HIV testing to make underwriting deci-
sions, that the insurance commissioner lacked authority to promulgate a regulation prohibiting this test-
ing); Health Ins. Ass'n. of Am. v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. Div. 1990) (holding that the
consideration of HIV in insurance underwriting is permissible).
49. See Austin, supra note 37, at 517 (acknowledging the use of sex, age, marital status, place of
residence, and occupation); Hellman, supra note 41, at 355 (noting that a 1988 survey revealed that
about one-half of the largest insurance companies in the United States denied disability insurance to
victims of domestic violence); Wortham, supra note 35, at 354-55 (identifying use of territorial rating
as a disguised form of racial discrimination, and the use of age, gender, physical and mental disabili-
ties, and socieo-economic status in various types of insurance).
50. See ABRAHAM, supra note 36, at 5 (utilizing the term egalitarianism to refer to the
antidiscrimination perspective); Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1647, 1657-58 (using the term collectivists
to refer to advocates of the antidiscrimination perspective).
51. See Kirsh v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., Cal. Rptr. 260, 262, 264 (Ct. App. 1991)
(opinion withdrawn from publishing, 1992 Cal. Lexis 1262) (holding that sex-based classifications are
discriminatory under the state's Civil Rights Act because these classifications perpetuate harmful stereo-
types that are not made permissible merely because they ensure the profitability of insurance compa-
nies); Wortham, supra note 35, at 360 (indicating that this perspective is grounded in civil rights law
concepts).
52. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r of Commonwealth, 482 A.2d 542,
547-48 (Pa. 1984) (stating that although rates may be actuarially sound, rates may still be unfair when
public policy considerations make it necessary to base rates on other factors including reliability, social
1999] Domestic Violence and Insurance Classification
cates of the antidiscrimination perspective argue that when social costs of using a
classification outweigh industry costs of not using a classification, social welfare
should govern insurers' decisions." Thus, subsidization by individuals of lower risk
should occur in order to make insurance available and affordable to higher risk indi-
viduals.54
Ill. Legislative and Regulatory Constraints on the Insurance Industry's Use of
Classifications
Insurance companies generally possess considerable discretion to develop and use
classifications." Constitutional provisions, federal and state legislation, and state regu-
lations, however, have limited the insurance industry's discretion to use certain classifi-
cations. The primary restriction on an insurance company's discretion has been
through state legislative and regulatory actions; the role of courts has largely been
limited to reviewing these legislative and regulatory actions.57
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the insurance industry is
"affected with a public interest" and thus it is subject to governmental regulation de-
spite its operation through private contracts. The public has an interest in the regula-
tion of the insurance industry because a large portion of the public's wealth is protect-
ed by insurance policies and because insurance may be regarded as a necessity in the
United States."9 Therefore, to protect the public welfare, the government may exercise
its police powers to ensure that the insurance industry is operated in the public's
acceptability, reasonableness, and causality which the court defined as "the actual or implied behavioral
relationship between a particular rating factor and loss potential"); Capital Blue Cross v.
Commonwealth Ins. Dep't, 383 A.2d 1306, 1309 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) (recognizing the importance
that underwriting decisions be supported by accurate statistical data, but that it is also in the best in-
terest of the public to examine the assumptions upon which the statistical projections are based).
53. See Hartford Accident & Indem., 482 A.2d at 584-85 (stating that when classifications, such
as sex and marital status, lack serious justification and there are serious public policy considerations
involved, the use of this classification should be prohibited); see also ABRAHAM, supra note 36, at 6
(stating that the government's solution to many important social problems is achieved through regula-
tion of the insurance industry).
54. See Austin, supra note 37, at 549 (describing arguments made by individualists, which is an-
other term used for advocates of the antidiscrimination perspective); see also Benjamin Schatz, Com-
mentary, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriting or Overreaching?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1782 (1987)
(advocating a public policy approach to assess whether HIV antibody test results should be used by
insurers making underwriting decisions).
55. See Wortham, supra note 35, at 353-54 (describing the extent of the insurer's discretion in
making insurance decisions).
56. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(l)-(17) to 2000e (1988) (prohibiting
employers from providing different benefits on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-448(G) (1998) (prohibiting the use of domestic violence as a classi-
fication for purposes of making life or disability insurance underwriting decisions); Colorado Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo. 1988) (holding that the use of sex as an
insurance classification violates the state's equal rights amendment).
57. See Austin, supra note 37, at 518 (describing the limited role courts have played); Gaulding,
supra note 32, at 1656 (stating that federal constraints are fairly limited but that state statutes and reg-
ulations are fairly extensive).
58. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 408-416 (1914) (stating that when pri-
vate property becomes "affected with a public interest," such as fire insurance, it may be regulated by
the public).
59. See id. at 413-14 (stating that these factors, in addition to the desire to lessen the burden of
catastrophes through distribution of risk of loss and the unequal bargaining powers of the parties in-
volved, differentiate insurance policy contracts from ordinary commercial contracts); see also Wortham,
supra note 35, at 351-52, 394-400 (describing the necessity of insurance).
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interest.'
A. Constitutional Provisions
Generally, insureds have not been successful in using the U.S. Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause and similar state constitutional provisions including Equal
Rights Amendments (ERAs), to restrict the use of insurance classifications.6' For
these provisions to be used successfully to restrict the use of any classification, there
must be federal or state action.62 Generally, courts have refused to classify heavily
regulated industries, including the insurance industry, as a form of federal or state
action. 3
On the other hand, the insurance industry has attempted to rely on constitutional
provisions, like the Due Process Clause of federal and state constitutions, to attack the
constitutionality of insurance regulations; however, generally, this attempt has been
unsuccessful.6' For example, in Katt v. Insurance Bureau," the Court of Appeals of
Michigan held that regulatory statutes prohibiting the rebating of insurance commis-
sions did not violate the state's due process clause.' Although insurers argued that
60. See German Alliance Ins., 233 U.S. at 413-14; see also United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writers Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (holding that insurance is commerce and thus subject to federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3); Gaulding, supra
note 32, at 1654-55 (acknowledging the power of Congress to regulate the insurance industry).
61. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that the exclusion of disability
insurance coverage for normal pregnancies did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment); Murphy v.
Harleysville Mutual Ins. Co., 422 A.2d 1097 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (holding that the use of age, sex,
and marital status in setting insurance rates did not violate the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause or the state's ERA); Austin, supra note 37, at 530. But see, e.g., Insurance Comm'r of Md. v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of U.S., 664 A.2d 862 (Md. 1995) (holding that a state insurance code
provision that authorized gender discrimination in insurance rates, even if it was statistically associated
to risk of loss, violated the state's ERA); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482
A.2d 542 (Pa. 1984) (holding that the state's ERA and public policy prohibit the use of classifications
based on sex in automobile insurance underwriting decisions, even if the use of sex as a classification
is statistically sound); Welsch v. Aetna Ins. Co., 494 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (dismissing a
claim alleging that the use of sex as a classification in automobile insurance underwriting decisions
violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, but recognizing that a claim may be
brought under the state's ERA).
62. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem., 482 A.2d at 586 (stating that the state's ERA requires
the presence of state action); Welsch, 494 A.2d at 411-12 (holding that a determination of the presence
of state action is irrelevant under the state's ERA and that the use of sex in determining automobile
insurance rates does not constitute state action even though the state requires automobile insurance to
lawfully operate an automobile); Murphy, 422 A.2d 1097 (holding that a sex discrimination suit under
the state's ERA failed for lack of state action).
63. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974) (rejecting the
argument that heavily regulated industries are a form of state action); see also supra note 62 and
accompanying text. But see, e.g., Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n v. Travelers Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358
(Colo. 1988) (finding a violation of the state's ERA when a private employer discriminated on the
basis of sex by providing a group health insurance policy that excluded coverage of expenses associat-
ed with a normal pregnancy). For a definition of state action, see Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351, 360 (stat-
ing that no single fact or relationship is dispositive in determining the existence of state action and
that a "sufficiently close nexus" must exist between the state and the contested action so that the
action may be considered as that of the state itself).
64. See, e.g., Katt v. Insurance Bureau, 505 N.W.2d 37 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the
insurer also failed to state a valid equal protection claim because he did not show that the regulations
affected his insurance company differently than other insurance companies).
65. 505 N.W. 2d 37 (Mich. CL. App. 1993).
66. See id. at 40 (stating that the rebating of commissions may result in unfair discrimination be-
cause insureds within the same risk group may receive differing rebates).
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the regulations unnecessarily restricted their liberty and property rights, the court found
that the legislature's goal of preventing unfair discrimination and promoting insurer
solvency and public convenience were legitimate and rational reasons for prohibiting
the use of rebates.'7 Therefore, the enactment of regulations to prevent unfair discrim-
ination were held to be a legitimate exercise of police powers to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare."
B. Federal Statutes
Proponents of the antidiscrimination perspective have relied on numerous federal
statutes to prohibit the use of insurance classifications that have a discriminatory effect.
One statute that has proven successful in restricting the use of classifications is Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," which prohibits employers from treating em-
ployees differently in the payment of salary and benefits on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin." 0 In two cases, the United States Supreme Court
relied on Title VII in refusing to support the fair discrimination perspective.7 In City
of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart" and Arizona Governing
Committee v. Norris,7 3 the Supreme Court held that under Title VII, employers may
not require different contributions to pension plans or provide different benefits be-
cause of an employee's sex. ' Thus, Title VII limits the insurance industry's use of
classifications based on race, religion, sex, and national origin; however, this limitation
applies only to employer-sponsored insurance plans.7
Generally, however, Congress has entrusted the states with the primary regulato-
ry authority over the insurance industry. 6 The lack of federal regulation of the insur-
ance industry indicates a congressional preference for state regulation.' This prefer-
67. See id. (stating that the public convenience was promoted by ensuring easier comparison of
insurance policies).
68. See id.
69. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(l)-(17) to 2000e (1988).
70. See id; see also NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, Insurance Discrimination Fact
Sheet (1995) (unpublished Legal Resource Kit on Insurance Discrimination, on file with the Journal of
Legislation) (contrasting Title VII restraints imposed on employers who provide group insurance to
providers of individual insurance).
71. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 (1983) (stating that accurate
generalizations about a class are not sufficient to justify class-based treatment); City of Los Angeles
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 n.24 (1978) (holding that Title VII focuses
on "fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes" and that although employers incur higher
costs in providing retirement benefits to females, the use of sex in developing retirement plans is not
justified).
72. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
73. 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
74. See Arizona Governing Comm., 463 U.S. at 1079-86 and n.14 (stating that "the greater costs
of providing retirement benefits for female employees does not justify the use of a sex-based retire-
ment plan'); City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power, 435 U.S. at 707-711 (prohibiting "treat-
ment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class').
75. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(l)-(17) to 2000e (1988) (stating that it is
unlawful for employers "to discriminate against any individuals with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin"). This legislation does have a considerable impact on annuity, health, disability, and
life insurance which is largely provided by employers through group insurance. See Wortham, supra
note 35, at 362 (noting that eighty-five percent of private hospital/medical insurance of individuals
under the age of sixty-five is issued on a group basis).
76. See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
77. See Arizona Governing Comm., 463 U.S. at 1100 n.6 (Powell, J. dissenting) (stating that Con-
gress has chosen to leave the regulation of the insurance industry to the states); Insurance Dep't. v.
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ence is evidenced by the McCarran-Ferguson Act,78 which established a presumption
of state regulatory authority over the insurance industry unless Congress explicitly
states an intent to regulate the insurance industry.79  Proponents of the
antidiscrimination perspective have proposed federal legislation to prohibit differentia-
tion based on race, sex, color, religion, domestic violence, or national origin in insur-
ance decisions; however, none of these proposals have been enacted.' Thus, to date,
Congress has not passed any legislation designed to overcome the presumption of state
control."
C. State Statutes and Regulatory Actions
1. Development of State Unfair Discrimination Statutes
All states have enacted legislation prohibiting unfair discrimination by the insur-
ance industry. 2 Many states enacted this legislation in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries to prohibit life and fire insurance companies from treating individu-
als in the same class and with similar life expectancies differently. 3 In addition, a
few states enacted statutes banning the use of racial classifications shortly after the
Civil War.84 It was not until the late 1940s, however, that the remainder of the states
passed unfair discrimination legislation.'
Unfair discrimination statutes serve a variety of purposes aimed at prohibiting
unfair methods of competition and deceptive practices including the use of certain
Philadelphia, 173 A.2d 811, 813 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) (stating that the insurance industry has histori-
cally been regulated by the states and not the federal government).
78. McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1011-1015 (1994)).
79. See id.
80. See, e.g., S. 467, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1117, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3145, 104th
Cong. (1996); H.R. 1201, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1793, 99th Cong. (1985); S. 372, 98th Cong.
(1983); S. 2204, 97th Cong. (1982); S. 2477, 96th Cong. (1980), 126 CONG. REc. 6536-39 (1980);
H.R. 100, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 100, 97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 100, 96th Cong. (1979); Wortham,
supra note 35, at 364 (discussing specific legislation that antidiscrimination proponents have proposed).
Insurance companies argue that because the McCarran-Ferguson Act indicates a congressional preference
for state regulation, the federal government should leave the issue of the use of insurance classifica-
tions, including domestic violence, to the states. See Insurance for Victims of Domestic Violence: Testi-
mony Regarding Health Insurance and Domestic Violence, Before the Comm. on Labor & Human
Resources. 1995 WL 449184 (1995) [hereinafter Echols] (statement of Peg Echols, Assistant Coun-
sel/Federal Affairs, State Farm Insurance Companies).
81. See Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1654. Therefore, if federal legislation prohibiting the use of
domestic violence as a classifier is passed, it may be the first federal legislation specifically designed
to preempt state regulations.
82. See Insurance Dep't v. Philadelphia, 173 A.2d 811, 813-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1961) (stating that
prior to 1945 only a few state insurance rate regulations existed, but that by 1948 all states had enact-
ed similar legislation which sought to protect the public welfare by prohibiting inadequate, excessive,
or unfairly discriminatory rates).
83. See Wortham, supra note 35, at 384 (describing the once common practice of rebating where
insurance agents offered a portion of their commission to potential customers, or offered other valuable
incentives, to encourage a sale); Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1656 (same).
84. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 122 (1998) (first enacted in 1884); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 500.2082 (1998) (first enacted in 1869).
85. See Insurance Dep't., 173 A.2d at 813-14 (stating that by 1948 all states had enacted unfair
discrimination statutes); Wortham, supra note 35, at 386 (noting that the passage of the 1945
McCarran-Ferguson Act caused insurance companies to lobby for state regulation in order to avoid fed-
eral antitrust laws).
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insurance classifications. ' These statutes seek to ensure the solvency of insurance
companies, require insurers to communicate terms and rates clearly to insureds, and
prohibit the use of fraud in sales tactics.87 These statutes also limit the use of classifi-
cations to those that are "fair"; however, because no definition of "fair" is included in
these statutes, insurance commissioners, legislators, and courts usually interpret the
meaning of this term through application of either the fair discrimination or
antidiscrimination perspective.'
2. Types of State Legislation Prohibiting Use of Discriminatory Classifications
a. State Unfair Discrimination Statutes
State legislation prohibiting the use of particular classifications takes numerous
forms." Some statutes prohibit only the use of classifications that are not actuarially
justified.' Other statutes prohibit differential treatment that is based "solely" on a
specific classification.9 Still others impose a heightened scrutiny standard that re-
quires more than a mere statistical association with loss, but does not completely ban
the use of classifications.' Finally, legislation based on the antidiscrimination per-
spective completely prohibits the use of classifiers such as race,93 sex," marital sta-
86. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-206 (Michie 1997) (defining unfair methods of competi-
tion and deceptive practices).
87. See Insurance Dep't, 173 A.2d at 814, 820 (stating regulations require insurance companies to
charge adequate rates, instead of decreasing rates, in response to the demands of competition to ensure
the availability of funds to pay policy claims); Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1656.
88. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1100 n.l (1983) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that most states prohibiting unfair discrimination merely prohibit discrimination within the
same class and allow classifications that are statistically sound); Telles v. Commissioner of Ins., 574
N.E.2d 359, 360-61 (Mass. 1991) (acknowledging that fair discrimination allows insurers to utilize
actuarially sound classifications but suggesting that had the court been presented with an argument
based on the state's ERA, the result may have been different); Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Corcoran,
551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 618-19 (App. Div. 1990) (arguing that cross-subsidization among differing risk
groups is not fair).
89. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(l)(f)(III) (1998) (permitting the use of classifications
that are statistically sound); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 4124 (1998) (prohibiting underwriting decisions
made "solely" on the basis of certain classifications).
90. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(l)(f)(III) (prohibiting the consideration of marital sta-
tus or sex unless it is statistically sound); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2, 109 (1997) (permitting the use of
mental or physical handicaps as a classification if it is supported by sound statistical evidence).
91. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-206(7)(F)-(G) (prohibiting the termination or modification
of insurance policies "solely" on the basis of mental or physical impairments, race, sex, or religion);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 4124 (prohibiting the termination or denial of property insurance "solely"
on the basis of occupation); FLA. STAT. ch. 626.9541(l)(g)(3) (1998) (prohibiting the cancellation or
denial of insurance, in addition to other underwriting decisions, "solely" because of a history of do-
mestic violence). See also Wortham, supra note 35, at 367 (stating that the meaning of these statutes
is somewhat unclear, but that this type of statute may restrict the use of a certain classification more
than those statutes that require only actuarial justification).
92. See, e.g., 215 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/236(b) (West 1998) (prohibiting insurers from considering
the presence of handicaps or disabilities unless it is based on sound actuarial principles, is a reason-
able classification, and is directly related to actual or reasonable anticipated experience); MiNN. STAT.
§ 72A.20(8) (1998) (prohibiting the consideration of the presence of a disability unless supported by
claims experience, statistically sound conclusions, and other data that show substantial and significant
differences in risk because of the disability).
93. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 20-1631 (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-206(7)(G); CAL INS.
CODE §§ 10140-10141 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-816 (1997). See also Willy E. Rice, Race,
Gender, "Redlining," and the Discriminatory Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance: An Historical
and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts,
1950-1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583 (1996).
94. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-Ill (1998) (applying only to automobile insurance);
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tus,9" national origin,' religion," and genetics due to the societal view that these
classifiers are unacceptable."
b. State Human and Civil Rights Statutes
State human and civil rights statutes may also prohibit the use of classifications
by the insurance industry."m For example, in Kirsch v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co., °1 the California Court of Appeals held that an automobile
insurer's practice of excluding coverage for normal pregnancy and Childbirth violated
the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act) which reflects the state's public policy that
men and women be treated equally."°2 The Unruh Act was enacted to declare the
state's public policy that sex-based differential pricing is harmful because it reinforces
harmful stereotypes and that differential pricing is not permissible "merely because it
is profitable."'' The court held, however, that the practice of charging women more
than men for medical insurance was permissible because an insurance code provision
that specifically permitted differential pricing superseded the Unruh Act."° But the
court held that the Unruh Act's limitations on arbitrary sex discrimination still pro-
hibited insurers from selling policies that excluded coverage for normal pregnancy and
childbirth because the insurance code was silent on whether insurers could offer poli-
cies containing different terms and coverage."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §§ 22E, 24A (applying only to automobile insurance); MICH. COMP.
LAws § 500.2027 (1998) (applying only to automobile insurance); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-25 (1998)
(applying only to automobile insurance). Only one state, Montana, completely bans the use of sex
discrimination in all types of personal insurance. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-309 (1997). Therefore,
under the majority of states' unfair discrimination statutes, most insurance companies may use sex as a
classifier. See Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1662. But see CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(f) (West 1998)
(requiring the use of sex-specific actuarial tables for life insurance and annuities).
95. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 23-66-206.
96. See, e.g., CAL iNS. CODE § 11628.
97. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-66-206; CAL- INS. CODE § 11628.
98. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-448(E); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-206 (prohibiting the use
of genetic discrimination only if there is no actuarial justification for the discrimination). See also
Naomi Obinata, Genetic Screening and Insurance: Too Valuable an Underwriting Tool to be Banned
from the System, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 145 (1992) (examining the moral
arguments advanced against the use of insurance classifications).
99. See Wortham, supra note 35, at 367-68 (stating that the use of these classifications is consid-
ered socially unacceptable because of their long history of abuse and the immutable and uncontrollable
characteristics).
100. See, e.g., Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act), CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1998) (prohibit-
ing arbitrary discrimination in "accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all
business establishments of every kind whatsoever").
101. 284 Cal. Rptr. 260 (Ct. App. 1991) (opinion withdrawn from publishing, 1992 Cal. Lexis
1262).
102. See id. at 262, 264; see also Binghampton GHS Employees Fed'l Credit Union v. State Div.
of Human Rights, 564 N.E.2d 1051 (N.Y. 1990) (describing the state's human rights law which pro-
hibited discrimination on the basis of sex in the rates, terms, and conditions of any form of credit).
103. See Kirsh, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
104. See id. at 264-65 (stating that Insurance Code § 10140 does not prohibit "the issuance, can-
cellation or pricing of life or disability insurance" because of the insured's sex).
105. See id. at 264-66 (stating that the exclusion of coverage for normal pregnancy and childbirth
constitutes sex discrimination because the only normal condition that is excluded from coverage under
this comprehensive medical insurance is pregnancy-related treatment which is uniquely a woman's con-
dition).
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3. Interpretation of State Unfair Discrimination Statutes
State courts have sought to interpret unfair discrimination laws and their affect
on the use of classifications by insurance companies." Historically, courts have gen-
erally interpreted unfair discrimination statutes to prohibit only classifications that are
not statistically associated with a risk of loss."ln Within the last twenty years, howev-
er, courts have begun to consider other factors, in addition to the statistical relationship
to risk of loss, to determine the validity of a classification."
For example, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania courts have historically relied on
the fair discrimination perspective to interpret unfair discrimination statutes." In old-
er cases, these courts held that actuarially sound insurance classifications were permis-
sible under the state's unfair discrimination statutes."' In more recent cases, howev-
er, courts in these two states have suggested that other factors may be considered in
determining the validity of a classification."' The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
106. See, e.g., Wilson v. Fair Employment & Housing Comm'n, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419 (Ct. App.
1996) (assessing whether the state's unfair discrimination law prohibits age-based underwriting deci-
sions); Fromberg v. Insurance Comm'r, 589 A.2d 544, 548 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1991) (describing the
standard of review for underwriting practices which requires that insurers produce facts that show the
statistical basis for the classification, the validity of the statistical evidence, and any direct and substan-
tial adverse effects on the insurer if the classification were not used); Insurance Fed'n of Pa. v. Foster,
587 A.2d 865 (Pa. Commw. CL 1991) (considering whether an insurer's underwriting criteria violates
the states unfair discriminations laws).
107. See Insurance Servs. Office v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 So.2d 515, 517 (La. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that the failure to use classifications based on sex or age, when the classification is statistical-
ly sound, constitutes unfair discrimination); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 630
A.2d 713, 720-21 (Md. 1993) (interpreting the state's unfair discrimination statute to permit the use of
age as a classification if it is statistically sound); see also Wortham, supra note 35, at 371 (stating
that regulators, legislators, and the courts give deference to the fair discrimination perspective which
may impede regulatory reform due to a heavy burden of justification for unfair discrimination statutes
based on antidiscrimination perspective).
108. See, e.g., Massachusetts Auto Rating & Accident Prevention Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins.,
424 N.E.2d 1127, 1134-35 (Mass. 1981) (holding that underwriting decisions must be nondiscriminatory
and reasonable as well as consistent with legislative and public policy); Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542, 581-82 (Pa. 1984) (holding that classifications must be sup-
ported by public policy); Capital Blue Cross v. Commonwealth Ins. Dep't, 383 A.2d 1306, 1310 (Pa.
Commw. CL 1978) (holding that it is permissible to question the assumptions upon which classifica-
tions are based).
109. See, e.g., Century Cab, Inc. v. Commissioner of Ins., 100 N.E.2d 481, 488 (Mass. 1951)
(holding that risks must be equitably adjusted to ensure each individual pays his own way); Schlabach
v. Commissioner of Ins., 195 N.E. 887, 888 (Mass. 1935) (holding that classifications, such as territo-
rial classifications, must be statistically associated with loss); Brest v. Commissioner of Ins., 169 N.E.
657, 659-61 (Mass. 1930) (holding that classifications based on territorial districts are permissible under
state and federal equal protection statutes); Physicians' Mutual Ins. Co. v. Denenberg, 327 A.2d 415,
420 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1974) (holding that it is unfair discrimination to charge individuals living in
different rating classifications the same rates); Insurance Dep't. v. City of Philadelphia, 173 A.2d 811
(Pa. Super. CL 1961).
110. See, e.g., Century Cab, 100 N.E.2d at 488; Schlabach, 195 N.E. 888; Brest, 169 N.E. at 659-
61; Physicians' Mutual Ins. Co., 327 A.2d at 420.
111. See Massachusetts Auto Rating, 424 N.E.2d at 1134-35 (holding that underwriting decisions
must be nondiscriminatory and reasonable and that the reasonableness of an underwriting decision may
also be affected by public and legislative policies); Hartford Accident & Indem., 482 A.2d at 547-48
(holding that regulations barring the use of gender in automobile insurance decisions are required under
unfair discrimination regulations and by public policy); Capital Blue Cross, 383 A.2d at 1310 (holding
that other factors such as the financial needs of the elderly and the effects and practicability of a
particular insurance classification should also be considered in determining the validity of a territorial
classification).
Journal of Legislation
chusetts and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have stated that other values, such as
fairness and the public and legislative policy of ensuring the availability of insurance
to all, may be considered in determining the reasonableness of rates."' The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court has stated that public policy concerns require courts to consider
several factors in determining the validity of a classification including the "causality,
reliability, social acceptability, and incentive value in judging the reasonableness of a
classification system.""' 3
Thus, actuarial soundness may no longer be the sole test of the validity of an
underwriting decision as the states are beginning to reexamine the traditional interpre-
tation of unfair discrimination statutes." 4 Therefore, as courts are becoming increas-
ingly more likely to judge the validity of insurance classifications by considering sev-
eral other factors including legislative and public policy concerns and the fairness or
reasonableness of the classification, reliance on the fair discrimination perspective to
interpret existing statutes has decreased." 5
Many courts continue to rely on the fair discrimination perspective, however,
when faced with challenges to state unfair discrimination statutes."6 For example, in
1990, the New York Appellate Division in Health Insurance Association of America v.
Corcoran'' addressed the use of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) as a classifi-
cation."' The court held that under the state's unfair discrimination statute, the denial
of coverage or the imposition of different rates based on sound actuarial practices is
permissible.' Therefore, due to the nature of HIV and its statistical association with
risk of loss, the court determined that it may be used as a classifier.2 ' These cases
illustrate that depending on the viewpoint of the court and which perspective the court
adopts, courts often interpret si'milarly worded unfair discrimination statutes different-
ly.'
2'
D. Specific Legal and Regulatory Restraints on the Use of Domestic
Violence as a Classifier
Within the past few years, many federal and state representatives have responded
to the news that insurance companies often use domestic violence as a classifier.'
2
112. See Massachusetts Auto Rating, 424 N.E.2d at 1134 (stating that underwriting practices "must
be 'reasonable' as well as 'nondiscriminatory'); Hartford Accident & Indem., 482 A.2d at 547-48
(holding that other values including fairness and public policy, which favors the restriction of exces-
sive, inadequate, or unfair rates, may outweigh the statistical association with loss); Capital Blue Cross,
383 A.2d at 1310.
113. See Hartford Accident & Indem., 482 A.2d at 584-85 (concluding that on the basis of these
factors, the use of classifications based on sex and marital status were not justified).
114. See generally Massachusetts Auto Rating, 424 N.E.2d at 1134-35; Hartford Accident & Indem.,
482 A.2d at 547-48; Capital Blue Cross, 383 A.2d at 1310.
115. See generally Massachusetts Auto Rating, 424 N.E.2d at 1134-35; Hartford Accident & Indem.,
482 A.2d at 547-8; Capital Blue Cross, 383 A.2d 1306.
116. See Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 619 (App. Div. 1990).
117. 551 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. Div. 1990).
118. See id. at 616-17.
119. See id. at 618. The New York Appellate Division stated that statistically sound underwriting
practices are not unfair, misleading, or discriminatory. See id. at 619.
120. See id. at 619.
121. Compare id. (permitting the use of HIV as a classification because it is statistically sound),
with Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542, 581-82 (Pa. 1984) (prohib-
iting the use of sex and marital status as a classification even though it is statistically sound).
122. See, e.g., Sanders 11, supra note 16 (unveiling legislation titled "The Victims of Abuse Insur-
ance Protection Act"); 141 CONG. REc. S3744-04 (daily ed. March 9, 1995) (statement of Sen.
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Many federal and state legislators have proposed legislation that restricts the use of
domestic violence as a classifier.2 a Many states have recently enacted this legisla-
tion.'
1. Federal Legislation
Federal legislators have introduced numerous bills in Congress that would restrict
the use of domestic violence as a classifier." Some of the proposed legislation pro-
hibits insurance companies from engaging in any practice that has the effect of charg-
ing more, denying, or canceling insurance for applicants with a known or suspected
history of domestic violence. 26 Other proposed legislation prohibits only the use of
domestic violence as a classifier but does not prohibit the adverse treatment of those
individuals insurers consider to be at high risk for victimization. '27 Therefore, insur-
ance companies still may use other predictors that will affect victims of domestic vio-
lence.s For example, insurance companies could consider the presence of medical
conditions that may have been caused by domestic violence to make underwriting
decisions that will still negatively affect these victims."2 Although to date, none of
the proposed federal legislation specifically designed to prohibit the use of domestic
violence as a classification have become law, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996"3 specifically includes provisions that protect victims of
Wellstone) (introducing the "Victims of Abuse Access to Health Insurance Act"); John Kerr, Wilson
Signs Domestic Violence Bills Dropping Diversion, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS 2688 (October 9, 1995) (de-
scribing two bills that Governor Pete Wilson from California, signed into law to prevent insurers from
denying or restricting coverage on the basis of domestic violence); Otis, supra note 6, at 3 (describing
the action taken by Sen. Wellstone and Rep. Sanders in calling for Congressional hearings as part of
a bi-partisan effort to enact legislation restricting the use of domestic violence as an insurance classifi-
cation); Showalter, supra note 27, at 44 (describing a new Ohio law designed to protect victims of
domestic violence from the loss of insurance benefits).
123. See, e.g., S. 467, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1117 105th Cong. (1997); FLA. STAT. Ch.
626.9541(g)(3)(e) (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4(VII)(f) (1998); S. 5436, 54th Leg.,1st Sess.
(Wash. 1996).
124. See, e.g., Act of May 22, 1997, 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 39 (codified at ALASKA STAT.
§§ 21.36.430, 21.36.440, 26.36.450 (Michie 1998)); MD. CODE ANN. INS., § 27-504 (1998); Domestic
Abuse Insurance Protection Act, ch. 141, 1997 N.M. Laws 1250 (effective July 1, 1997) (codified at
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-16B-1 to 59A-16B-10 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-8-301 to 56-8-306
(1998) (enacting the 'Domestic Violence Victims Health Insurance Protection Act").
125. See, e.g., S. 467, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing the "Victims of Abuse Insurance Protection
Act"); H.R. 1117 105th Cong. (1997) (same); H.R. 3145, 104th Cong. (1996) (proposing the "Insurance
Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence Act"); H.R. 1201, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing the
"Domestice Violence Insurance Protection Act of 1995"); H.R. 3178, 104th Cong. (1996) (proposing
the "Women's Health Equity Act of 1996'); S. 1799, 104th Cong. §§ 2251-2257 (1996) (same); H.R.
1920, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing the 'Domestic Violence Victims Insurance Protection Act of
1995'); S. 524, 104th Cong. (1995) (proposing the "Victims of Abuse Access to Health Insurance
Act'); H.R. 1191, 104th Cong. (1995) (same).
126. See, e.g., S. 467, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 1799, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 524, 104th Cong.
(1995); H.R. 3145, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 3178, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 1191, 104th Cong.
(1995); H.R. 1201, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Hellman, supra note 41, at 406-07 (analyzing the
strengths and weaknesses of proposed federal legislation).
127. See, e.g., H.R. 1920, 104th Cong. (1995) (stating that "[a]n insurer may not deny or cancel
health insurance coverage for an individual solely on the basis that the individual is or has been the
subject of an act of domestic violence") (emphasis added). As a result, insurance companies may still
use other classifiers that will have an adverse effect on victims of domestic violence. See id.; see also
Hellman, supra note 41, at 405.
128. See Echols, supra note 80 (stating that "medical conditions of ALL applicants (from whatever
cause) must be considered in order to underwrite fairly and avoid improper subsidies").
129. See id.
130. See Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.
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domestic violence from discrimination by prohibiting the use of domestic violence as a
preexisting condition in underwriting decisions and by prohibiting companies from
denying group health insurance to victims of domestic violence.' 3'
2. State Legislation
Since 1994, forty-three states have enacted legislation restricting the use of do-
mestic violence as a classifier for insurance purposes.'32 Three other states are cur-
rently considering similar legislation. 3 a
Enacted and proposed state legislation is very similar to the different types of
proposed federal legislation. Some legislation forbids the use of domestic violence only
when it is not statistically correlated with risk of loss and other legislation permits the
use of domestic violence as long as it is used with another predictive variable by stat-
ing that insurance companies may not make underwriting decisions "solely" or "only"
because of a history of domestic violence."M Other legislation prohibits insurance
companies from charging more for, denying coverage, or making underwriting deci-
sions because the individual was, is, or may be a victim of domestic violence.
35
Many of the states with this type of legislation, however, still permit insurers to make
and 42 U.S.C.).
131. See id.
132. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.36.430, 21.54.100 (Michie 1998); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 20-448(G)
(1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-86-306(a)(1)(G) (Michie 1997); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1374.75 (West 1998); COLO. REV STAT. § 10-3-1104.8 (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-816(18)
(1998); DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2302(5), 2304(24)-(25) (1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 626.9541(1)(g)(3)
(1998); HAW. REV. STAT. §431:10-217.5 (1998); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/155.22a, 97/25(A)(1)(g)
(West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-24.3 (1998); IOWA CODE §§ 507B.4(7)(c), 513B.9A(l)(g) (1998);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(7)(d) (1997); H.B. 315 (Ky. 1998) (enacted); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 22.250.3(A)(1)(g) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159-B (West 1998); MD. CODE
ANN. INS., § 27-504 (1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, §§ 95B, 108G, 120D; ch. 176A, § 3A; ch.
176B, § 5A; ch. 176G § 19 (1999) ; MINN. STAT. § 72A.20(8) (1998); Mo. REV. STAT. §375.1312
(1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-18-216, 33-22-526 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-7401 to 44-7410
(1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.413 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 417:4(7)(f) (1998); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 17B:26-2.lq (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-16B-1 to 16B-10 (Michie 1998); N.Y. IN-
S. LAW § 2612 (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-68-35 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-
36.3-01 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.21 (Anderson 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.015
(1998); PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1171.3, 1171.5(a) (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-60-4 (1998); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 38-41-45, 38-71-860 (Law Co-op. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-188-27 (Michie 1998);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-8-301 yo 56-8-306 (1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-A-21-501 to 31-A-21-
506 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 38:2-3431 (Michie 1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.18.550 (1999); W.
VA. CODE §§ 33-4-20, 33-15-2a, 33-16-la (1998); WIS. STAT. § 632.748 (1998); Wyo. STATo ANN.
§ 26-19-107(g) (Michie 1998).
133. See S. 260, 145th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1999); S.2728, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 1999);
76th Legis. (Tex. 1999).
134. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.36.430, 21.54.00 (prohibiting insurers from making underwrit-
ing decisions "if the refusal, cancellation, denial, or increase results only from the fact that the person
was a victim of domestic violence"); FLA. STAT. ch. 626.9541(I)(g)(3); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-
2404(7)(d); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159-B; NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.413; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 417:4(7); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2612. For example, this type of legislation permits insurers
to make underwriting decisions based on information about frequency of losses or medical conditions,
even if the cause of the condition was domestic violence. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.36.430,
21.54.00; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159-B.
135. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-448; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.75; CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 38a-816; DEL CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2302(5), 2304(24-25); 215 ILL. COMp. STAT. 5/155.22a;
MD. CODE ANN. INS., § 27-504; MINN. STAT. § 72A.20(8); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3901.21; OR.
REV. STAT. § 746.015; PA. CONS. STAT. § 1171.5(a); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-8-301 to 56-8-306; W.
VA. CODE §§ 33-4-20, 33-15-2a.
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decisions based on medical conditions, even if the cause of the condition was domestic
violence.'" Remedies for violations of these regulations also differ; however, most
regulations do not provide the victim with a private cause of action. 7
As demonstrated by the legislation described above, most state and federal legis-
lation contains loopholes that permit insurance companies to continue making under-
writing decisions that adversely affect victims of domestic violence." Legislation
that merely forbids insurers from making underwriting decisions "solely" or "only"
because of a history of domestic violence permits insurers to use other related factors,
such as medical conditions that have been caused by domestic violence, which will
adversely affect these victims.' For example, State Farm acknowledged that al-
though it may be prohibited from making underwriting decisions "solely" on the basis
of a history of domestic violence, it will still consider medical conditions, regardless of
their cause, from which it can infer the patient's increased likelihood of filing future
insurance claims.' Thus, State Farm will consider medical conditions that are indic-
ative of a history of domestic violence in making its underwriting decisions.'" In ad-
dition, another loophole is that many insurers are still able to use domestic violence as
a classification because most of the enacted and proposed legislation only prevents
insurance companies from using domestic violence as a classifier for certain types of
insurance.4"
Therefore, for these regulations to sufficiently protect victims of domestic vio-
lence, the regulations must prohibit the insurance industry from directly or indirectly
using an individual's history of domestic violence in making any underwriting deci-
sion. In addition, to provide adequate enforcement of these regulations, legislation
should expressly provide victims with a private cause of action against insurers who
violate these regulations."
136. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-448(G); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155.22a; W. VA. CODE
§§ 33-4-20, 33-15-2a.
137. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-448 (providing only for an administrative remedy); DEL_
CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2302(5). 2304(24)-(25) (stating that insurers may not be held civilly or crimi-
nally liable for noncompliance); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.015 (providing for notification by the director
of insurance when noncompliance is suspected, hearings to determine noncompliance, and the suspen-
sion or revocation of the insurer's certificate of authority to issue insurance for willful violations);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31A-21-501 to 31A-21-506 (denying a private cause of action).
138. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.36.430, 21.54.100 (prohibiting underwriting decisions based
"only" on a history of domestic violence); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-448(G) (prohibiting the use of do-
mestic violence as a classification only in life and disability insurance).
139. See Echols, supra note 80 (stating that "medical conditions of ALL applicants (from whatever
cause) must be considered in order to underwrite fairly and avoid improper subsidies").
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 20-448(G) (applying only to life and disability insurance); 215
ILL. Coup. STAT. 5/155.22a (applying only to life, health, and disability income insurance); UTAH
CODE ANN §§ 31A-21-501 to 31A-21-506 (applying only to life and disability insurance).
143. Cf. Wortham, supra note 35, at 371 (noting that insurance classifications are not generally re-
viewed by state insurance regulators); cf. also supra note 24 (discussing the reasons why it is difficult
to determine how widespread this problem is). As a result, insurance regulators are unlikely to catch
insurers using domestic violence as an insurance classification; therefore, for unfair discrimination stat-
utes that prohibit the consideration of domestic violence to be effective, the state must provide the
victim with a private cause of action. But see Megan O'Matz, Some Pa. Insurers in Violation of
Law: Their Manuals List Spouse Abuse as a Criteria to Assess Risk, Even Though No Discrimination
Was Found, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, at Al4 (describing the results of an investigation done by
Pennsylvania insurance regulators two years after the state made it illegal for insurers to make deci-
sions based on a history of domestic violence) According to a recent investigation, twenty-five insur-
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IV. Insurers Have Provided No Statistical Support that Domestic Violence is
Associated with Higher Risk of Loss
The primary reason given by insurance companies in favor of using domestic
violence, or other factors, as an insurance classification is that it is statistically associ-
ated with the insured's risk of loss.'" Relying on the fair discrimination perspective,
insurance companies assert that the use of classifications is fair because victims of
domestic abuse are statistically more likely to be victimized again and thus, they are
more likely to draw from insurance pools than individuals who are not victims of
domestic violence.1'4
Generally, states require a classification to be statistically associated with a high-
er risk of loss.'" As a result, despite the additional restrictions some states place on
the use of particular classifications, insurance companies must be able to provide evi-
dence that a certain classification is statistically associated with a higher risk of loss
before use of the classification is permitted." 7
Insurance companies, however, have failed to provide any evidence that victims
of domestic violence are statistically more likely to draw from insurance pools than are
non-victims."' Peg Echols, Assistant Counsel of Federal Affairs for State Farm In-
surance Company, stated that "there is insufficient data available to measure costs
associated with insuring victims of domestic violence.""4 In another interview, State
Farm admitted that it had no statistical basis for using domestic violence in insurance
decisions and justified the use of the classification as "just sort of a logical conclu-
sion."'" Deborah Senn, the Washington State Insurance Commissioner, has also stat-
ed that there is no "bona fide evidence that the victims of abuse are a greater risk" for
drawing from insurance pools.'"' Therefore, because insurance companies have failed
to produce any statistical support for the use of the domestic violence classification,
the use of domestic violence as a classification should not be permitted under any cur-
rent state unfair discrimination statute.'52
ance companies possessed underwriting manuals listing domestic violence as a criteria for determining
risk. See id.
144. See Deborah L. Shelton, Adding Insult to Injury: Families Hurt by Domestic Violence Take
Second Hit When Insurers Deny Them Coverage, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 4, 1995 at 23; Hellman,
supra note 41, at 356-58 (justifying the use of domestic violence as a classification on the basis of
the principle known as "actuarial fairness").
145. See Hellman, supra note 41, at 356-57.
146. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(l)(f)(lll) (1998) (prohibiting the use of marital sta-
tus or sex unless it is actuarially sound); 215 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/236 (West 1998) (prohibiting insur-
ers from using the presence of handicaps or disabilities unless it is based on sound actuarial principles,
is a reasonable classification, and is directly related to actual or reasonable anticipated experience).
147. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(7)(c) (1997) (permitting the use of mental or physical
handicaps as a classification if it is supported by sound actuarial evidence); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 72A.20(8) (West 1999) (prohibiting the use of the presence of a disability unless supported by
claims experience, statistically sound conclusions, and other data that show substantial and significant
differences in risk because of the disability).
148. See Echols, supra note 80 (stating that "there is insufficient data available to measure costs
associated with insuring victims of domestic violence"); Fountain, supra note 18, at 1; Shen, supra
note 17, at Al (quoting K.C. Eynatten, a spokesperson for State Farm, who stated that State Farm
used domestic violence as a classification despite the fact that there was no statistical evidence that it
was associated with a higher risk of loss).
149. See Echols, supra note 80.
150. See Fountain, supra note 18, at I.
151. See Shen, supra note 17, at Al.
152. See Echols, supra note 80; Wortham, supra note 35, at 370 (noting that state unfair discrimi-
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V. Comparison of Other Prohibited Classifications to the use of Domestic
Violence as a Classification
Despite the lack of statistical evidence supporting the use of domestic violence as
an insurance classification, for the purposes of Part V we will assume that there is
evidence that domestic violence is statistically associated with a higher risk of loss.
Thus, assuming that a history of domestic violence is statistically associated with a
future risk of loss, the ultimate question arises, even if domestic violence is a strong
predictor of loss, should society still permit insurance companies to make insurance de-
cisions on the basis of domestic violence?
Originally the use of all classifiers, including race, that were statistically associat-
ed with a risk of loss was permissible.' After the Civil War, some states began to
ban the use of race explicitly; however, the prohibition on the use of other insurance
classifications began after states passed unfair discrimination statutes." 4 Most states
merely interpret their unfair discrimination statutes to forbid the use of race according
to an antidiscrimination perspective, while a few states explicitly ban the use of race as
an insurance classification.'
There are numerous reasons why classifiers such as race have been interpreted as
discriminatory under unfair discrimination statutes." For example, some classifica-
tions such as race are immutable traits, uncontrollable, not "socially optional," or have
been historically associated with invidious discrimination. 5' In addition, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has stated that public policy concerns such as "causality, reli-
ability, social acceptability, and incentive value" are important in determining whether
a classification is consistent with public policy and thus reasonable. 5 Many of these
nation statutes are interpreted to permit the use of a classification if it is statistically sound). Insurance
companies often use classifications that are not based on a statistical correlation, in violation of the
state's unfair discrimination statute; however, because classifications are not generally reviewed by state
insurance regulators. See id. at 371.
153. See City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707, 725-26
(1978) (recognizing that sex is a statistically valid consideraton in determining risk of loss for life in-
surance, annuities, and pension plans); Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542, 543 (Wis. 1953) (stating
that age, occupation, and past medical history are associated with longevity); Gaulding, supra note 32,
at 1658 (noting that race is statistically related to a higher risk of loss in life insurance).
154. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 122 (1998) (first enacted in 1884) (implementing a prohibi-
tion on the use of race after the Civil War); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2082 (1998) (first enacted in
1869) (implementing a prohibition on the use of race after the Civil War); Insurance Dept. v. Philadel-
phia, 173 A.2d 811, 813-14 (Pa. Super. CL 1961) (stating that by 1948 all states had enacted unfair
discrimination statutes).
155. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1548 (1998) (explicitly prohibiting the use of race as an
insurance classification); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-816 (1999) (explicitly prohibiting the use of race as
an insurance classification); MONT. CODE § 33-18-210 (1997) (explicitly prohibiting the use of race as
an insurance classification); Wis. STAT. § 625.12 (1998) (explicitly prohibiting the use of race as an
insurance classification); Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1659-60 (stating that many states rely on unfair
discrimination statutes to prohibit the use of race as an insurance classification).
156. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542, 548-49 (Pa. 1984)
(stating that public policy concerns should be considered in conjunction with any statistical basis sup-
porting the use of an insurance classification).
157. See ABRAHAM, supra note 36, at 27-28 (stating that the egalitarian, otherwise known as the
antidiscrimination, perspective requires that immutable traits, uncontrollable risks, socially unavoidable
risks such as driving, but not boating, and socially unacceptable classifications should not be utilized
in developing insurance classifications); Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1647 (stating that classifiers based
on noncausal or immutable traits or classifiers that have been historically associated with invidious
discrimination, would be forbidden under the antidiscrimination perspective).
158. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Cf., 482 A.2d at 584-85 (concluding that on the basis of
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factors that have contributed to a finding that classifications, such as race, should be
prohibited are also relevant to determining the acceptability of using domestic violence
as an insurance classification.159
Insurance companies assert that the use of domestic violence as an insurance
classification is justified because it is controllable and voluntary because victims have
a choice to remain in the abusive relationship.'" The insurance industry argues that it
should have the discretion to consider this dangerous or risky lifestyle choice in mak-
ing insurance decisions.'"' Therefore, unlike race, which is unquestionably an immu-
table trait and thus clearly uncontrollable, it is possible to argue that domestic violence
is controllable. This argument is generally based, however, on the mere stereotype that
victims of domestic violence are responsible for their own abuse.62
Nevertheless, domestic violence is not truly a voluntary, controllable choice for
several reasons. First, domestic violence is not controllable by victims because victims
are subjected to the uncontrollable, criminal acts of a third person who often inflict
abuse even after the victim attempts to, or does in fact, leave the abusive environ-
ment.'63 Victims of domestic violence are battered and criminally assaulted by anoth-
er uncontrollable individual.'" Just as victims of other crimes do not choose to be
victimized, victims of domestic violence do not elect to be assaulted." Therefore,
because victims of other crimes are not held responsible for their injuries, insurance
companies should not hold victims of domestic violence responsible for their inju-
ries.'"
In addition, although it is relatively easy for individuals who make dangerous
these factors, the use of classifications based on sex and marital status were not justified).
159. See Hellman, supra note 41, at 382 n.69 (discussing the assertion that domestic violence
causes a higher risk of loss); Shen, supra note 17, at Al (describing the controllability of domestic
violence victimization); See also Durborow, supra note I I (describing the lack of control victims of
domestic violence have over their victimization).
160. See Shen, supra note 17, at Al (stating that insurance companies claim that women who
choose to remain in these abusive relationships are similar to sky divers and travelers who enter war
zones in that they choose to put themselves in dangerous situations); Durborow & Fromson, supra
note 16, at 7 (describing how insurance companies compare victims of domestic violence to skydivers,
motorcyclists, or window washers of skyscrapers because they make a voluntary lifestyle or career
choice).
161. See Fountain, supra note 18, at Al.
162. See id. ,(stating that the use of domestic violence as an insurance classification perpetuates the
stereotype that victims choose to remain in abusive relationships); Activists Say Insurers Deny Cover-
age to Battered Women. L.A. TIMEs. May 13, 1994, at D2 (quoting Representative Charles Schumer,
chairman of the House criminal justice subcommittee, who stated that the use of domestic violence as
an insurance classification serves to perpetuate the myth that these victims are responsible for their
injuries).
163. See Durborow, supra note 11 (stating that research indicates that victims of domestic violence
face a risk of greater harm, or even death, if they attempt to leave their batterers); Durborow &
Fromson, supra note 16, at 7.
164. See Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at 7 (stating "[d]omestic violence is a crime, not a
career, a lifestyle or a choice").
165. See Durborow, supra note 11 (arguing that the comparison of victims of domestic violence to
other voluntary career choices, like race car drivers, is an example of the myths associated with do-
mestic violence and that this argument ignores the real issue concerning violence against women).
166. See Diana Griego Erwin, Some Insurance Policies Add to Abuse of Women, SACRAMENTO
BEE, March 2, 1995, at A2 (quoting ABA President-elect Roberta Cooper Ramo, who stated that "[w]e
don't hold victims of crime responsible for their injuries" because "[i]nsurance companies do not deny
coverage for an individual who has been shot or stabbed by a stranger . . . they should not revoke
coverage when the attacker is a spouse"); Howard Kline, Insurers Shouldn't Hurt Victims Again, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), May 23, 1997, at BI0.
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career and lifestyle choices, like skydivers and motorcyclists, to quit and avoid taking
these risks, it is extremely difficult and dangerous for victims of domestic violence to
attempt to leave their abusive environments. 7 More than one-half of all women who
leave their batterers are pursued, harassed, or attacked." As a result, victims of do-
mestic violence must either remain in the abusive environment or attempt to leave,
which often results in more severe abuse from their angry partners who pursue
them." Hence, because these victims continue to be victimized even after they at-
tempt to leave, they do not really have any control over their abuse because they will
continue to be abused whether they remain in the situation or not.'7 This continued
high risk of loss, even when victims attempt to leave, is recognized by insurance com-
panies because insurers who use domestic violence as a classification generally do not
distinguish between victims who stay and victims who leave the abusive environ-
ment.'7 ' Thus, the insurance industry's argument, that the use of domestic violence
classification is justified because victims voluntarily choose to stay in dangerous sit-
uations, is substantially weakened by the fact that insurance companies treat victims
who stay in the abusive environment the same as those who leave.'72 Therefore, be-
cause domestic violence is a criminal act caused by an uncontrollable third person who
often continues to inflict battering when victims attempt to, or do, leave the abusive
environment, and because the argument that domestic violence is controllable is merely
based on a stereotype, it can be said that domestic violence is uncontrollable. ' The
acknowledgement that domestic violence, like race, is uncontrollable, is one reason
why domestic violence should not be used as an insurance classification.'7
A second reason the use of race, and other traits, as an insurance classifier has
been prohibited is because it is not the actual cause of the higher risk of loss."' For
167. See Saunders, supra note 2 (stating that victims of domestic violence are often forced to re-
main with their batterers for safety and economic reasons); Morrison, supra note 3, at 272 (acknowl-
edging that victims' fear of retaliation from their batterers, lack of financial resources, and lack of
housing is justified).
168. See Durborow, supra note 11 (stating that according to research studies, victims of domestic
violence face a risk of greater harm or even death if they attempt to leave their batterers); Hellman,
supra note 41, at 374 (noting also that in one study, over one-half of the men who killed their spous-
es, committed the killing when they were separated).
169. See 141 CONG. REC. H10720-01, H10723 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Ms. Waters)
[hereinafter Waters] (stating that separated and divorced women represent only seven percent of the
U.S. population and account for seventy-five percent of all battered women, indicating that many bat-
tered women do escape their abusive environments; however, these women report being battered four-
teen times more often than women who move in with their parents); Durborow, supra note I.
170. See Waters, supra note 169.
171. See L.H. Otis, Violence Victim Challenges State Farm, 101 NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. &
CAsuALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., May 19, 1997, at 67 (describing the case of a woman who was
denied automobile and homeowner's insurance and told that her coverage may be reconsidered when
her batterer was "out of the picture").
172. See generally id.; Stein, supra note 2, at 16 (stating that if medical records contain informa-
tion concerning previous injuries due to battering, victims may be denied coverage even if they have
divorced or left the batterer).
173. See generally Activists Say Insurers Deny Coverage to Battered Women, LOS ANGELES TIMES,
May 13, 1994, at D2 (discussing the stereotype that victims choose to stay in abusive relationships);
Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at 7 (stating that domestic violence is a crime caused by the
uncontrollable acts of another person).
174. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 36, at 27-28.
175. See Lange v. Rancher, 56 N.W.2d 542 (Wis. 1953) (holding that race may not be used as a
classification in life insurance because there is no causal explanation for the difference in mortality
rates between blacks and whites).
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example, the prevalence of sickle cell anemia is higher among African Americans;
however, the cause of the disease is not due to an individual's race but rather the
presence of the sickle cell gene."' On the other hand, in the case of domestic vio-
lence, insurance companies assert that the use of domestic violence as a classifier is
justified because domestic violence causes a higher risk of loss.1" However, the
cause of the victim's higher risk of loss is not the victim-it is the batterer"' Insur-
ance companies should not be permitted to further victimize the domestic violence
victim who did not cause the criminal attack committed by another uncontrollable
individual.' Therefore, like race, because the actual cause of a higher risk of loss is
the uncontrollable, criminal act of a third person, and not the insured/victim, domestic
violence should not be used as an insurance classification.
The final, and perhaps the most important, reason the use of certain classifica-
tions, including race, have been prohibited is because the classifications have been
associated historically with invidious discrimination." ° Unlike race, it may be argued
that victims of domestic violence have not traditionally been victims of invidious dis-
crimination in the insurance industry because the insurance industry does not generally
make arbitrary insurance decisions, but rather, seeks to utilize factors that are statisti-
cally associated with a risk of loss."8' The insurance industry has thus far failed,
however, to provide any statistical support for the conclusion that domestic violence is
associated with a higher risk of loss." 2 It has been shown that many underwriting
decisions are based merely on informal methods, stereotypes, and subjective beliefs,
thus underwriting decisions and insurance classifications, such as domestic violemce,
may be arbitrary and irrational.'83 Therefore, because the insurance industry's conclu-
sion that domestic violence is associated with a risk of loss is not based on statistical
evidence, which is required by unfair discrimination statutes, the use of domestic vio-
176. See Hellman, supra note 41, at 381 (acknowledging, however, that several states even prohibit
insurance companies from using the presence of a sickle cell anemia gene as a classifier in insurance
decisions).
177. See id. at 384-87 (describing arguments victims' advocates advance in opposition to the insur-
ance industry's position that a risk of higher loss is caused by domestic violence).
178. See Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at 7 (describing criminal assault as the cause of
domestic violence).
179. See generally Fountain, supra note 18, at I (stating that victims of domestic violence should
not be punished for reporting or seeking treatment for domestic violence); Shelton, supra note 144, at
23 (arguing that victims should not be victimized again by being denied insurance coverage).
180. See generally Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1659-60.
181. Brest v. Commissioner of Ins., 169 N.E. 657, 660-61 (Mass. 1930) (stating that risk of loss
must be based on statistical experience).
182. See Insurance for Victims of Domestic Violence: Testimony Regarding Health Insurance and
Domestic Violence, Before the Committee on Labor & Human Resources, 1995 WL 449179 (1995)
(stating that insufficient data exists to evaluate the risks associated with insuring victims of domestic
violence); Shen, supra note 17, at Al (quoting Deborah Senn, the Washington state insurance commis-
sioner, who stated that there is no "bona fide evidence that the victims of abuse are a greater risk"
and K.C. Eynatten, a spokesperson for State Farm, who stated that the insurance company used domes-
tic violence as a classification despite the fact that they did not have any statistical evidence to sup-
port the view that it is associated with a higher risk of loss).
183. See Capital Blue Cross v. Commonwealth Ins. Dep't, 383 A.2d 1306, 1309 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1978) (noting that underwriting decisions are not based on "an exact science"); Wortham, supra note
35, at 354 (describing informal methods insurance companies may also use in insurance decisions, such
as lists of unacceptable risks that are informally passed amongst underwritiers; Gaulding, supra note
32, at 1652 (suggesting that insurance decisions are more likely to be made on the basis of subjective
beliefs); Morrison, supra note 3, at 269 (noting, however, numerous reasons why in actuality, insurance
decisions are rarely based on sound statistical methodology).
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lence as an insurance classification should be considered arbitrary and thus, invidious
discrimination.1
84
In sum, victims of domestic violence lack control over their abusive environ-
ments, are not the cause of their higher risk of loss, and have been the subject of past
invidious discrimination by the insurance industry. 5 Therefore, several of the factors
traditionally used to prohibit or restrict the use of certain classifications, like race, are
present and thus, legislation prohibiting the use of domestic violence as an insurance
classification should be enacted.86
VI. Reasonableness as the Main Factor to be Used in Determining the Fairness
of an Insurance Classification
Due to the varied interpretations of current unfair discrimination statutes, legisla-
tion that expressly forbids or restricts the direct or indirect use of domestic violence as
an insurance classification should be enacted. Many states have begun to regulate the
use of domestic violence as an insurance classification through the states' unfair dis-
crimination statutes." However, if there is no express statutory prohibition, the use
of domestic violence as an insurance classification may be permissible because state
courts have historically permitted the use of classifications that are statistically associ-
ated with a higher risk of loss."' Therefore, relying on the fair discrimination per-
spective, if domestic violence, or other factors, are statistically associated with a higher
risk of loss, insurance companies may use these factors in insurance classifications.'
Recently, however, some courts have begun to consider other relevant factors, such as
public policy, social acceptability, and fairness, in determining whether a classification
is reasonable or whether it should be interpreted as being prohibited by a state's unfair
discrimination statute."s Thus, the underlying factor that courts are beginning to ad-
184. See generally supra notes 148-52 and accompanying test (discussing the lack of statistical
support for the argument that domestic violence is associated with a higher risk of loss).
185. See generally Shelton, supra note 144, at 23 (stating that victims should not be victimized
again by being denied insurance coverage); Shen, supra note 17, at Al (noting that no sufficient sta-
tistical evidence exists to support the use of domestic violence as an insurance classification);
Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at 7 (stating that domestic violence is a crime caused by the
uncontrollable acts of a another person).
186. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 36, at 27-28 (describing the factors that have been used
to restrict the use of certain classifications); Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1647 (stating that classifiers
based on noncausal or immutable traits or classifiers that have been historically associated with invidi-
ous discrimination, would be forbidden under the antidiscrimination perspective).
187. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.36.430, 21.54.100 (Michie 1998); MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 27-
504 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-16B-1 to 16B-10 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-8-301
to 56-8-306 (1998).
188. See Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1100 n.6 (1983) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that most states have determined that classifications that are statistically associated with a
higher risk of loss do not violate unfair discrimination statutes).
189. See Insurance Serv. Office v. Commissioner of Ins., 381 So.2d 515, 517 (La. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding that the failure to use classifications based on sex or age, when the classification is statistical-
ly sound, constitutes unfair discrimination); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 630
A.2d 713, 720-21 (Md. 1993) (interpreting the state's unfair discrimination statute to permit the use of
age as a classification if it is statistically sound).
190. See Massachusetts Auto Rating & Accident Prevention Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins., 424
N.E.2d 1127, 1134 (Mass. 1981) (holding that the state insurance ommissioner has the discretion to
adjust classifications of risk in order to fulfill the legislative policy to ensure that automobile insurance
is available to all eligible drivers at reasonable rates); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Insurance
Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542, 548 (Pa. 1984) (holding that public policy concerns require more than mere
statistically sound classifications); Capital Blue Cross v. Commonwealth Ins. Dept., 383 A.2d 1306,
1309 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (holding that to adequately protect the public, insurance regulators must
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dress, in addition to the statistical association with risk of loss, is whether or not the
classification is reasonable.'
Therefore, the ultimate question that should be addressed when analyzing wheth-
er a particular classification should be restricted, either expressly through unfair dis-
crimination statutes or implicitly through an interpretation of unfair discrimination
statutes, is whether the use of a classification is reasonable." The consideration of
traditional factors, including controllability, causation, and immutability, that are used
to determine whether the use of a classification is permissible are based also on the
reasonableness of a classification.' 93 For example, if a particular trait, such as race, is
uncontrollable, it is not necessarily fair or reasonable to use that trait as a means to
impose higher insurance premiums. Thus, the main factor to consider in determining
whether an insurance classification should permitted is whether the classification is
reasonable.'"
The insurance industry, courts, legislatures, and regulatory officials should use a
cost analysis test, weighing the costs to the insurance industry of not using the classifi-
cation versus the costs to society of permitting the use of the classification, to deter-
mine the reasonableness of a classification."' Kenneth Abraham recognized the prac-
ticality of using a similar type of balancing test because few people rely exclusively on
either the fair discrimination or the antidiscrimination perspective.'" Abraham re-
ferred to this approach used to determine the validity of a classification, as "intuitive
pragmatism" because it seeks to preserve the values of liberty, social utility, and equal-
ity." Abraham reasoned that most individuals would be willing to sacrifice one of
these values in order to respond to significant concerns about the preservation of an-
other one of these values.'9
Therefore, in determining the reasonableness of a classification, courts, the insur-
ance industry, and legislatures should use a cost analysis test that is similar to the
"intuitive pragamatism" approach advocated by Abraham. Thus, if the costs to society
outweigh the costs to the industry and the public's desire for equality, public policy
and social utility would require that the use of that particular classification be prohibit-
ed. 199
look at the assumptions upon which the classifications are based and thus beyond mere statistical sup-
port for the classification). But see Health Ins. Assoc. of Am. v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 618-19
(App. Div. 1990) (requiring only actuarial justification for the use of HIV as an insurance classifica-
tion).
191. See Hartford Accident & Indent., 442 A.2d at 548 (stating that "public policy considerations
require more adequate justification for rating factors than a simple statistical correlation with loss; ...
such as causality, reliability, social acceptability and incentive value in judging the reasonableness of a
classification system') (emphasis added).
192. See generally id.
193. See generally id.
194. See generally id.
195. See Schatz, supra note 54, at 1794 (recommending a similar balancing test for examining
what, if any, restrictions public policy would require on the use of HIV as an insurance classification).
196. See ABRAHAM, supra note 36, at 29-30 (stating that both the fair discrimination and
antidiscrimination perspectives have some appealing qualities including the recognition of socially desir-
able regulations, regulations that are supported by public policy, and the desire to ensure equality).
197. See id. (describing this approach as intuitive because it is not based on an exact mathematical
formula).
198. See id. (stating that most people, for example, would be willing to sacrifice equal treatment
when large social welfare gains would outweigh this equal treatment).
199. See generally id.
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A. Restrictions on the Use of Domestic Violence as a Classifier: Costs to the
Insurance Industry
The insurance industry is a private industry with the ultimate goal of making a
profit.' ° Insurance companies state that this goal is accomplished through accurate
calculations of an individual's risk of loss, wise investments of money received from
premiums, and from the size of the pool of insureds.2 ' The insurance industry argues
that when premiums are based on accurate calculations of an individual's risk of loss,
insurance companies are able to ensure the availability of funds to adequately satisfy
any claims that arise.' 2 Thus, insurance companies are able to make a profit from
wise investments of those premiums prior to satisfaction of any claims.'
Therefore, the primary argument the insurance industry advances against restrict-
ing the use of domestic violence as a classifier is that if domestic violence is not used,
premiums will not be based on accurate calculations of risk and the insurance industry
will become less profitable.' Profitability would decrease because victims of domes-
tic violence, who are at a higher risk of loss, will not be grouped together with other
individuals who pose a similar risk, for the purposes of determining premiums.'
The more accurate the assessment of risk, the less chance the total losses will exceed
the cost of the premiums the insureds have paid.' If the assessment of risk is inac-
curate, the insurer will be responsible for covering the excess losses.2 Insurers'
fears about profitability may be unsubstantiated, however, because many of the insur-
ance companies that do not currently utilize domestic violence as an insurance classifi-
cation remain profitable.' In addition, courts have generally held that economic con-
cems alone are insufficient to justify discriminatory practices.'
200. See Insurance Dep't. v. Philadelphia, 173 A.2d 811, 824-27 (Pa. Super. Ct.. 1961) (recognizing
the need to consider insurers ability to earn a fair and reasonable profit in approvals of rate making);
Don't Let Insurers Cancel - Some Companies Compound Abuse, supra note 1, at IOA (stating that
insurance companies are "in the business of calculating risk for profit").
201. See Massachusetts Auto. Rating & Accident Prevention Bureau v. Commissioner of Ins., 424
N.E.2d 1127, 1135 (Mass. 1981) (recognizing that insurers earn most of their profits through investing
and not through underwriting); Katt v. Commissioner of Ins., 505 N.W.2d 37, 40 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that profit is necessary to ensure the availability of adequate resources to cover as-
sumed risks and to satisfy claims).
202. See Katt, 505 N.W.2d at 40.
203. See Massachusetts Auto. Rating, 424 N.E.2d at 1135.
204. See Shen, supra note 17, at Al (quoting David McMahon, vice president of First Colony Life
Insurance Co., who stated that if insurance companies do not use domestic violence as a classification,
insurance companies may become bankrupt).
205. See generally Hellman, supra note 41, at 398-99 (stating that the benefit of placing similar
risk individuals in the same group is that the insurer is then able to offer more competitive rates to
the lower risk groups because they are segregated from higher risk insureds).
206. See Katt, 505 N.W.2d at 40.
207. See Gaulding, supra note 32, at 1651.
208. See In re NJ.A.C. 11:1-20, 505 A.2d 177, 180 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (suggesting
that the financial status of the entire insurance industry is favorable due to wise investments and al-
lowable tax burdens and therefore, insurers must comply with regulations designed to ensure the "rea-
sonable, equitable, and fair treatment" of the public); Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at 7 (not-
ing that the companies that do not use domestic violence as a classification do not become bankrupt
and can still provide affordable and competitive rates).
209. See Kirsh v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., Cal. Rptr. 260, 264 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding
that differential pricing based on the sex of the insured is not permissible "merely because it is prof-
itable"); Morrison, supra note 3,' at 286 (stating that the goal of insurance regulation should be to
permit insurance companies to strive for profitability, and restrict the use of discriminatory practices).
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Insurers also argue that because the insurance industry is a private industry,
insurance companies should be able to conduct their business in a way that maximizes
profitability and that any attempt to interfere with this legitimate goal constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of private property for public use."' Therefore, in an effort to
maximize profitability, insurance companies should be free to contract with insureds on
the basis of risk.2" ' Insurers argue that if the their freedom to contract on the basis of
risk is denied, the free market would be abridged because the accurate grouping of
insureds according to risks also enables insurers to compete more effectively. 2 In-
surance companies argue that because competition results in more reasonable prices,
efficiency, and innovation, restraints on competition caused by restrictions on the use
of classifications should not be implemented." 3
The United States Supreme Court has ruled, however, that state governments
may utilize their police powers to regulate the classifications used by insurance compa-
nies because insurance is private property affected with a public interest."4 In addi-
tion, according to Professor Wortham risk classifications have generally not been suc-
cessful in decreasing the cost of insurance." ' Thus, because other more acceptable
forms of competition exist, restricting the use of risk classifications will not seriously
affect competition." 6 Professor Wortham has suggested that other, more desirable
methods of competition, such as requiring the availability of standardized market infor-
mation enabling consumers to comparison shop on price, would be more preferable
alternatives than competition achieved through the use of classifications based on risk
of loss." 7 Other methods of competition may be more preferable because these meth-
ods could result in a decrease in the cost of insurance for all insureds." 8 Therefore,
due to he availability of more preferable, alternative means of competition, insurers
210. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914) (holding that insurance is pri-
vate property affected with a public interest and thus the government may utilize its police powers to
regulate the industry); Wilson v. Fair Employment & Housing, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 427 (Ct. App.
1996) (holding that the refusal to insure a pilot because of age does not bear "a reasonable relation to
commercial objectives appropriate to an enterprise serving the public"); In re NJ.A.C. 11:1-20, 505
A.2d at 182, 185 (holding that emergency regulations enacted to protect public health, safety, and wel-
fare did not constitute a taking).
211. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 266, 286 (stating that insurance companies assert that profit-
ability, and not protecting public interests, is a permissible goal of a private industry).
212. See generally Insurance Dep't. v. City of Philadelphia, 173 A.2d 811, 820 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1961) (holding that the public interest justifies the need to regulate the insurance industry despite argu-
ments that regulations constitute a taking of private property for public use and violate the concept of
free enterprise).
213. See Wortham, supra note 35, at 403-04 (describing the four types of competition that occurs
among insurers: competition by adjustment of price and service, product differentiation, loyalty and dil-
igence of salespeople, and risk selection).
214. See German Alliance Ins. Co., 233 U.S., at 412-13 ("[Tlhe business of insurance so far ef-
fects the public welfare as to invoke and require governmental regulation.").
215. See Wortham, supra note 35, at 405 (discussing statistics on property and casualty insurance
costs presented to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee in 1980).
216. See id. at 403-04.
217. See Wortham, supra note 34, at 873-74 (acknowledging problems, such as the "incomprehensi-
bility" of insurance contracts, associated with competition achieved by providing information enabling
consumers to comparison shop).
218. See Wortham, supra note 35, at 406 (stating that too much attention has been given to the
risk selection process and too little attention has been given to other more desirable methods that in-
crease competition).
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would not have to rely merely on the use of classifications as a means of competition,
which has generally not been necessary or successful." 9
Insurers also assert that cross-subsidization would not be fair to low risk insureds
because fairness requires each individual to pay only for their own risk of loss.2"'
All insurance involves some subsidization, however, because insurance evolved as a
means of distributing loss.22" ' Insurers argue, however, that according to a survey re-
leased by the Insurance Research Council (IRC), consumers are opposed to subsidizing
insurance for victims of domestic violence. 2 Domestic violence activists question
the validity and reliability of this study because an insurance industry organization con-
ducted the study.223 It can also be argued that fairness requires that victims of crimes,
like domestic violence, should not be victimized once again by the insurance industry
through the use of classifications that result in the restriction of insurance coverage
that is generally regarded as a necessity in this country. 4 Therefore, although insur-
ers would assert that cross-subsidization is unfair to low risk insureds, the use of do-
mestic violence as a classification is unfair to these crime victims because they are
being victimized again by the insurance industry."
Finally, insurers argue that if domestic violence is not used in making underwrit-
ing decisions, batterers would be given a financial incentive to batter their victims in
order to receive the proceeds of a life insurance policy if the victim is killed. 6 Thus,
insurers maintain that the denial of coverage, based on a history of abuse, protects the
victims from further abuse, or even murder, by not giving the batterer an incentive to
batter because the victim would not be able to receive life insurance.' Insurers,
219. See id. at 403-07; Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at 7.
220. See Telles v. Commissioner of Ins., 574 N.E.2d 359, 361-62 (Mass. 1991) (acknowledging
that fair discrimination allows insurers to group individuals posing the same risk together for determi-
nation of premiums to ensure that individuals posing a lower risk do not subsidize those who present
a higher risk of loss; therefore, unfair discrimination occurs only when individuals who pose the same
risk are treated differently); Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d 615, 618-19 (App.
Div. 1990) (stating that a goal of insurance regulation is to ensure that underwriting practices are fair
to policyholders by not requiring cross-subsidization of differing risk categories).
221. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 412 (1914) (stating that the fundamen-
tal goal of insurance is to widely distribute the risk of loss so that many individuals will bear the risk
thereby decreasing the risk of great catastrophes); Insurance Fed'n of Pa., Inc. v. Foster, 587 A.2d
865, 870 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (quoting the testimony of the Vice President of Guardian Life Insur-
ance Company of America in which he stated that the risk of loss is decreased by pooling the claims
of many individuals).
222. See L.H. Otis, IRC Domestic-Abuse Survey Sparks Charges of Industry Bias, NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., Sept. 22, 1997, at 4 (quoting from the IRC
Report which stated that "despite the fact that most Americans think domestic violence is a serious
problem, they are not willing to subsidize those living in households with a history of domestic vio-
lence in order to make insurance affordable for them").
223. See id. (quoting Deborah Senn, Washington Insurance Commissioner, who stated that the ques-
tions utilized in the national telephone survey were leading).
224. See Durborow, supra note 11 (stating that "insurers are damning women" if they seek medical
attention and document their injuries and "damn[ing] them" if they do not, because the women will
remain in the abusive environment); Wortham, supra note 35, at 394-396 (discussing the necessity of
insurance).
225. See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 482 A.2d 542, 548-49 (Pa.
1984) (stating that rates may be actuarially sound, resulting in no cross-subsidization, but still unfair
because public policy considerations make it necessary to examine other factors including reliability,
social acceptability, reasonableness, and causality); Durborow, supra note 11.
226. See Erwin, supra note 166, at A2; Seelye, supra note 14, at A7 (quoting K.C. Eynath, a
spokeswoman for State Farm, who argued that batterers are given a financial incentive to kill to re-
ceive the proceeds of a life insurance policy).
227. See Ronald Powers, Insurance Denied to Battered Women, NEW ORLEANS TIMES - PICAYUNE,
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however, are already adequately protected because insurance policies, and state law,
usually prevent beneficiaries from collecting claims resulting from intentional miscon-
duct.' In addition, according to experts, batterers abuse their victims in order to
control and maintain dominion over their victims, not for financial reasons.' There-
fore, insurers' concerns about potential financial incentives are unfounded.'
B. The Use of Domestic Violence as a Classifier: Costs to Society
The social costs associated with the use of domestic violence as an insurance
classification are extensive." The effects of this classification are far-reaching be-
cause although the denial or high cost of insurance directly harms a victim of domestic
violence, the consequences of this insurance decision have many indirect social im-
plications including the promotion of a continuous cycle of abuse. 2
For the domestic violence victim, the costs of the use of domestic violence as an
insurance classification are great. 3 The use of this classification puts victims at a
limitless risk of loss because they are often denied insurance or access to benefits,
such as necessary medical treatment.' The risk of losing insurance coverage may
discourage victims from seeking the medical attention or legal intervention they
need.' As a result, the recent progress made by advocates and legislators in inter-
rupting the cycle of abuse, will be undermined because the use of this classification
will discourage reporting, treatment, prosecution, and prevention.' Therefore, be-
May 13, 1994, at A2; Seelye, supra note 14, at A7.
228. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 274.
229. See Statement of the American Medical Association to the Committee of the Judiciary of the
U.S. Senate on Domestic Violence, 104th Cong. (1996); Domestic Violence: Testimony Before the U.S.
House of Representatives Comm. on Gov't Operations, 1994 WL 541271 (1994) (stating that domestic
violence often occurs as an attempt to assert coercive control over a partner); Domestic Violence, 103d
Cong. (1994) (oral testimony of Patricia R. Salber, MD, FACEP, of the American College of Emer-
gency Physicians before the House Gov't Operations Committee) (defining domestic violence as "a part
of a pattern of coercive behaviors which an individual uses to establish and maintain power and con-
trol over another with whom he/she has or has had an intimate, romantic, or spousal relationship").
Insurers, however, may utilize these same policy provisions that exclude coverage for intentional acts,
to deny claims made by the victim. See Otis, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing proposed federal legisla-
tion designed to protect victims of domestic violence from being further victimized by insurance com-
panies); L.H. Otis, No Compromise on Abuse Model Law, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-
RISK & BENEFITS MGMr., June 16, 1997, at 12 (stating that victim advocates argue that denial of
victim's claims further victimizes the innocent victim).
230. See Morrison, supra note 3, at 274.
231. See generally Senn, supra note 5 (stating that the use of domestic violence as an insurance
classification has undermined social policy goals of eliminating the social costs of abuse); Domestic
Violence: Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Gov't Operations, 1994 WL
541271 (1994) (describing the reasons why domestic violence is a public health issue).
232. See 141 CONG. REc. H10720-01 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) [hereinafter Roybal-Allard] (state-
ment of Ms. Roybal-Allard, Chair of the Violence Against Women Task Force for the congressional
caucus for women's issues) (stating that "domestic violence affects all of us directly or indirectly and
whether we know it or not").
233. See generally Sloat, supra note 15, at IA (quoting Deborah Senn, Washington State Insurance
Commissioner, who stated that "refus[ing] to insure victims courageous enough to heed advocates' ad-
vice about disclosure simply ensures that the costly cycle of violence continues").
234. See 142 CONG. REc. E1013-03 (daily ed. June 6, 1996) (statement of the Honorable Earl
Pomeroy) (citing several examples of insurance companies denying coverage, increasing costs of premi-
ums, and refusing to pay for emergency room visits for victims of domestic violence).
235. See Senn, supra note 5 (stating that the use of medical and legal records discourages women
from reporting abuse for fear that this information will be recorded in their records and later used to
deny them insurance).
236. See Sanders, II supra note 16 (introducing the Victims of Abuse Insurance Protection Act);
1999] Domestic Violence and Insurance Classification
cause victims will be more reluctant to seek treatment or to press charges they will be
less likely to leave because they will not have contact with many medical providers or
other individuals who could prove instrumental in the victim's decision to leave." 7 In
addition, victims will not be as assured that they will be adequately protected from
future abuse by their batterers because victims will be more reluctant to seek prosecu-
tion or protective orders. 23 ' As a result, children will continue to witness this abuse,
or possibly be- subjected to abuse themselves, and according to experts, will be more
likely to become abusers or victims when they become adults.2 9 Therefore, the cycle
of abuse will continue in future generations.2"
The continued use of domestic violence as an insurance classification, which
discourages women from leaving their abusive situations, also may result in an in-
crease in the prevalence of medical problems, especially birth defects.24 ' As the re-
search shows, the frequency of domestic violence attacks increases during
pregnancy. 242 Thus, if women are subject to increased abuse for which they fail to
seek medical treatment, the rate of birth defects is likely to increase.243
Society also has an interest in protecting victims of domestic violence, a crime,
from further victimization by insurance companies. 2' Advocates argue that the gov-
ernment has an obligation to protect individuals against crime and that if the state has
failed to fulfill this duty, the entire community, instead of the victim only, should share
141 CONG. REc. S3744-04, 53752 (daily ed. March 9, 1995) [hereinafter Welistone] (statement of Sen.
Wellstone) (acknowledging that "[rleporting domestic violence and seeking medical help is often the
first step in ending the cycle" of domestic violence).
237. See Jeannette Vorell, Insurers Shouldn't Hurt Victims Again, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May
23, 1997, at BI0 (describing the experience of one woman who stated that the availability of insur-
ance coverage, despite her history of abuse, permitted her to seek the counseling which was instrumen-
tal in prompting her to leave and divorce her abusive husband).
238. See Senn, supra note 5 (stating that victims of domestic violence will not report their abuse
to police, seek protective orders, or obtain medical treatment and counseling if they fear that they may
lose or be denied insurance coverage).
239. See 141 CONG. REC. H10720-01, H10723 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Ms. Waters
and Ms. Jackson-Lee) (stating that research shows that that children who witness abuse at home are
more likely to become abusers or victims when they become adults). In addition, according to the re-
search, children who witness abuse in the home "are at high risk for alcohol and drug use, depression,
low self-esteem, poor impulse control, and sexual acting out." Id.
240. See id.
241. See Domestic Violence: Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 1994 WL 541271 (1994) (describing the various health problems associated with domestic
violence such as premature deafness, immune system disorders, increased problems during pregnancy,
and mental health consequences such as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder).
242. See Webwire - Violence Against Women, 1996 WL 256735 (May 15, 1996) (statement of the
American Medical Association to the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate) (stating that according
to one recent study, it is estimated that up to one-forth of all pregnant women may be physically
abused); Wellstone, supra note 236.
243. See Domestic Violence: Testimony Before the U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 1994 WL 541271 (1994) (describing the risks associated with abuse during pregnancy, in-
cluding "lower birth weight, low matemal weight gain, infections, anemia, smoking and use of alcohol
or drugs"). Due to the health-related consequences of domestic violence and the high costs of abuse-
related treatment, many advocates have classified domestic violence as a public health issue. See id.
(citing a study conducted at Rush Presbyterian Medical Center that estimated the average annual, na-
tional health care costs associated. with domestic violence to be $857.3 million); Webwire - Violence
Against Women, supra note 242.
244. 141 CONG. REc. H9223-05 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1995) (statement of Mr. Fox) (discussing the
need to coordinate legislative, police, and community action to reduce the frequency of domestic vio-
lence).
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the costs of the subsequent injuries." Therefore, because it is unfair to deny cover-
age or charge excessive rates to victims of a crime resulting from inadequate law en-
forcement efforts, society should bear the cost associated with these victims' excess
risk of loss.21
Another cost to society resulting from the use of domestic violence as an insur-
ance classification is the threat that individuals who are not victims of domestic vio-
lence may be misidentified as victims by insurance companies and classified as high
risks.27 One important source of information insurance companies rely on are medi-
cal records.2" Insurance companies inspect medical records for certain types of mul-
tiple injuries that are often associated with domestic violence. 2'9 Therefore, due to the
lack of perfect predictability, it is possible that people who have suffered similar inju-
ries may be grouped with victims of domestic violence and denied insurance cover-
age.m
Finally, the necessity of insurance in the United States reflects a societal view
that insurance should be accessible and affordable." If domestic violence continues
to be permitted as an insurance classification, these victims may be unable to
drive, 2 purchase a home, 3 or enter domestic violence shelters. 4 Thus, if the
use of domestic violence as an insurance classification is continued, society will be
forced to continue to subsidize the extensive costs associated with the use of this clas-
sification, and the cycle of abuse will continue. 5
245. See Heilman, supra note 41, at 387 (arguing that the belief that victims of domestic violence
have not been adequately protected by the government, justifies the position that these victims should
not be denied insurance or forced to pay higher rates).
246. See id.
247. See generally Capital Blue Cross v. Commonwealth Ins. Dept, 383 A.2d 1306, 1309 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1978) (noting that underwriting decisions are not based on "an exact science"); Wortham,
supra note 35, at 354 (describing informal methods insurance companies use in making underwriting
decisions, such as lists of unacceptable risks that are informally passed among underwriters); Gaulding,
supra note 32, at 1652 (suggesting that insurance decisions are more likely to be made on the basis
of subjective beliefs); Morrison, supra note 3. at 270 (acknowledging the lack of statistical accuracy in
risk rating and the practice of some insurance companies of relying on assumptions and stereotypes
rather than scientific and statistical analysis).
248. See Insurance for Victims of Domestic Violence, 1995 WL 449182 (July 28, 1995) (statement
by Timothy T. Flaherty, MD, of the AMA, to the Committee on Labor & Human Resources, U.S.
Senate) (discussing the AMA's role in reducing the prevalence of domestic violence).
249. See generally Hellman, supra note 41, at 357 (noting that insurers look for "noor medical his-
tories" to determine risk of loss).
250. See generally Morrison, supra note 3, at 270.
251. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 414-15 (1914) (discussing the necessity
of insurance); Wortham, supra note 35, at 394-400 (asserting that society has an obligation to question
the legitimacy of insurance classifications, because in the United States there is a public choice to ful-
fill insurance needs through the private sector). Wortham also suggests several ways of addressing the
problem of insurance availability that is caused through the use of insurance classifications. See id. at
400-02.
252. See Durborow, supra note 11; Wortham, supra note 35, at 394 (stating that approximately
one-half of the states require liability insurance in order to drive).
253. See Durborow, supra note 11 (acknowledging the need for homeowners insurance in order to
rent or own a home); Wortham, supra note 35, at 396 (stating that fire insurance is necessary to
obtain a mortgage).
254. See Sanders, II supra note 16 (acknowledging the problem shelters are having in obtaining
property insurance); Durborow & Fromson, supra note 16, at 4-5 (describing specific situations where
domestic violence shelters were denied insurance coverage).
255. See generally Roybal-Allard, supra note 232.
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VII. Conclusion
A cost analysis approach comparing the cost to society of using a particular
insurance classification, such as domestic violence, to the cost to the insurance industry
of not using the classification represents the most economical and socially desirable
method of determining the permissibility of using particular insurance classifications.
Application of this cost analysis approach to the use of domestic violence as an insur-
ance classification reveals that the social costs of using the classification outweighs the
costs to the insurance industry of not using the classification. The primary cost sus-
tained by the insurance industry is economic, which courts generally have not recog-
nized as a legitimate ground for discrimination. Therefore, in comparing this illegiti-
mate cost incurred by the industry versus the numerous economic, physical, psycholog-
ical, law enforcement, and other costs that society will face, it is clear that the social
costs exceed the industry costs. Therefore, the use of domestic violence as an insur-
ance classification is unreasonable and should not be utilized.
Thus, due to society's strong interest in the use of domestic violence in insurance
classifications, legislation prohibiting the direct and indirect use of domestic violence
as an insurance classification should be passed and current unfair discrimination laws
should be interpreted to prohibit any use of domestic violence in insurance classifica-
tions. Finally, for this legislation, designed to protect victims of domestic violence, to
be effective, it must provide victims with a private cause of action against insurance
companies that violate these regulations. It is only through this mechanism that this
legislation will be adequately enforced causing the insurance industry to stop any con-
sideration of domestic violence in making its insurance decisions.
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